The Problem With Salients

A special assessment of the Russian salient in Eastern Ukraine

Image: @War_Mapper on Twitter/ X

In his just-published interview with The Economist, the deputy head of Ukrainian military intelligence, Major General Vadym Skibitsky, tells us that “things are as difficult as they have ever been since the early days of Russia’s full-scale invasion. And they are about to get worse…our problem is very simple: we have no weapons. We always knew April and May would be a difficult time for us.”

The current grim situation on the frontline will take some time to turn around. And things may get worse for the Ukrainians in the east before they get better. As Konrad Muzyka of Rochan Consulting wrote this week, “we have reached the point where the situation on the front is the worst since March 2022. The numerical advantage of the Russians is constantly growing, as is the number of attacks. Ukraine did not survive the darkest hour. It's just about to start.”

It has been clear for some time that the shortages of manpower and firepower have combined to force Ukrainian high command to choose between retaining territory and keeping their depleted Army functioning while they reconstitute over the coming months. I explored this military and political challenge in a post back in early April.

It is the eastern Ukraine frontline which is causing the most concerns at the moment - at least for ground operations (and recent step ups in Russian attacks on Kharkiv are also a big concern). Two key sectors of this eastern front have seen Russian advances in the past month.

And while these might appear to be separate axes of advance, there is the possibility of the Russians using them as the southern and northern arms of a double envelopment of Ukrainian positions and forces in eastern Ukraine. The aim of this quick assessment is to examine the Russian advances, particularly the Ocheretyne salient and the opportunities and risks it poses for the Russians in the short term.