At the risk of irrelevance prior to Part II, I’ll hazard a thought or two. Using the framework of three types of mistakes here is my take: The UAF has evidenced ability (non-failure) to adapt. This is seen on tactical levels and operational and even in logistics and weapon adaption. The next period will further test their ability to adapt to new technologies (several!) and new organisational matrices in the assault brigades. So we measure success by evidence of operational and tactical flexibility.
The UAF has evidenced ability to learn at the technical levels, and at some tactical levels. It is important here to distinguish between the units in the Bakhmut trenches (some of which are TD) and units of the professional Services which began transforming in 2014-15. The former are literally in a rut, even if at the strategic level they are fighting Ukraine’s Verdun. The latter, ironically, learned their craft, art and science in the same DonBas region but have since proved capable in other terrains and in more dynamic conflict contexts. In the future, learning will be measured by performance at a multiple brigade level, by segued operations, intelligent use of reserves, etc.
The final criterion, failure/ability to anticipate is the most demanding. There are few surprises in static trench warfare. In mobile warfare there are many. It is clear that the UAF has been better able to anticipate Russian actions than the converse. But it is not yet clear that the UAF can consistently hindfoot the Russians. This is a chess -laying region, and I give higher marks for the intelligence of The Ukranian command structure than that of the Russians. But this is greatest ask; can these battles be mobile and if so, can the UAF dictate the operational tempo? If they can, I would mix metaphors and call it Game, Set and Match.
Mick (I apologize for the unwarranted familiarity), I must first say that when I took up your recent subscription solicitation I was hoping for this type of analysis and commentary and, of course, you have delivered.
If I may be terrifically presumptive, your thesis is very simple: the definition of winning and losing is complicated. Very, very complicated.
You have very adequately addressed the nature of the complications, "...tactical, operational, strategic, political..." and then added further complication, e.g. time frame, etc. You provide clear commentary about many of the complications and what is largely unsaid but is terrifically clear to a reader is that "winning" to one person can easily be seen as "losing" to a totally different person, each of whom might be supporters / opponents of Ukraine.
All I can say, Sir, is "Wow!" Your writing on this terrifically difficult (for me) area (war) and this one "little" piece, how does one determine winning and/or losing is outstanding. Clearly, Sir, you have met my hopes for obtaining a better understanding of these matters. Subscription monies well spent.
Very interesting and informative essay, thank you. However, I did notice one critical measure of success/failure that worries me: managing the risk of escalation. I don’t know how much of this is within Ukraine’s control, but certainly there will need to be some constraints on their actions lest Putin decide to go nuclear as a result. For example, if Ukraine were to have a dramatic breakout towards Crimea, or (should they attack elsewhere) start putting actual Russian territory at risk, I think the consensus is that the risk of nuclear weapon use is significant.
Cutting the "land bridge" and the water supply to Crimea = checkmate, IMO. The peninsula becomes unsustainable once Ukraine has the Azov and Kerch inside their missile envelope.
Hi this is good writing. Please keep going. Giving theory is good but giving clear concise applicable examples would be helpful to me (me = someone with 0 background knowledge)
Proposed definition of minimum success: grab military enough land to show that Russian will loose in 4 years so as everyone can anticipate this. This will set the conditions for political change.
This is great PME. Thank you.
At the risk of irrelevance prior to Part II, I’ll hazard a thought or two. Using the framework of three types of mistakes here is my take: The UAF has evidenced ability (non-failure) to adapt. This is seen on tactical levels and operational and even in logistics and weapon adaption. The next period will further test their ability to adapt to new technologies (several!) and new organisational matrices in the assault brigades. So we measure success by evidence of operational and tactical flexibility.
The UAF has evidenced ability to learn at the technical levels, and at some tactical levels. It is important here to distinguish between the units in the Bakhmut trenches (some of which are TD) and units of the professional Services which began transforming in 2014-15. The former are literally in a rut, even if at the strategic level they are fighting Ukraine’s Verdun. The latter, ironically, learned their craft, art and science in the same DonBas region but have since proved capable in other terrains and in more dynamic conflict contexts. In the future, learning will be measured by performance at a multiple brigade level, by segued operations, intelligent use of reserves, etc.
The final criterion, failure/ability to anticipate is the most demanding. There are few surprises in static trench warfare. In mobile warfare there are many. It is clear that the UAF has been better able to anticipate Russian actions than the converse. But it is not yet clear that the UAF can consistently hindfoot the Russians. This is a chess -laying region, and I give higher marks for the intelligence of The Ukranian command structure than that of the Russians. But this is greatest ask; can these battles be mobile and if so, can the UAF dictate the operational tempo? If they can, I would mix metaphors and call it Game, Set and Match.
Mick (I apologize for the unwarranted familiarity), I must first say that when I took up your recent subscription solicitation I was hoping for this type of analysis and commentary and, of course, you have delivered.
If I may be terrifically presumptive, your thesis is very simple: the definition of winning and losing is complicated. Very, very complicated.
You have very adequately addressed the nature of the complications, "...tactical, operational, strategic, political..." and then added further complication, e.g. time frame, etc. You provide clear commentary about many of the complications and what is largely unsaid but is terrifically clear to a reader is that "winning" to one person can easily be seen as "losing" to a totally different person, each of whom might be supporters / opponents of Ukraine.
All I can say, Sir, is "Wow!" Your writing on this terrifically difficult (for me) area (war) and this one "little" piece, how does one determine winning and/or losing is outstanding. Clearly, Sir, you have met my hopes for obtaining a better understanding of these matters. Subscription monies well spent.
Very interesting and informative essay, thank you. However, I did notice one critical measure of success/failure that worries me: managing the risk of escalation. I don’t know how much of this is within Ukraine’s control, but certainly there will need to be some constraints on their actions lest Putin decide to go nuclear as a result. For example, if Ukraine were to have a dramatic breakout towards Crimea, or (should they attack elsewhere) start putting actual Russian territory at risk, I think the consensus is that the risk of nuclear weapon use is significant.
Cutting the "land bridge" and the water supply to Crimea = checkmate, IMO. The peninsula becomes unsustainable once Ukraine has the Azov and Kerch inside their missile envelope.
Hi this is good writing. Please keep going. Giving theory is good but giving clear concise applicable examples would be helpful to me (me = someone with 0 background knowledge)
Proposed definition of minimum success: grab military enough land to show that Russian will loose in 4 years so as everyone can anticipate this. This will set the conditions for political change.