“Long range” in European (Ukrainian) terms is up to, say, 1500kms. It is 1100km from Warsaw to Moscow; 760km Kyiv to Moscow. By contrast, Darwin to China is 6000km and to Jakarta is 2700km. There is simply no comparison between the theatres and therefore, between the strategic choices for the protagonists. This was why the Allies had to slowly and painfully island-hop to get within bomber range of Japan in WW2.
The Army will be irrelevant in any war with China. As Gonzalo said, it will not try to invade. It WILL seek to isolate and subjugate Australia into subservience. Australia’s best (indeed, only) strategy (apart from its alliances - a dangerous policy perhaps in the age of Trump) is to make itself a “prickly hedgehog”, deny sea access to its coastal littoral using submarines, missiles and maybe aircraft, and keep its sea lanes open for essential re-supply. It is self-sufficient in food and energy but needs imports for vital electronics and chips. All this calls into question the need for nuclear subs: why would Australia need to patrol the Chinese coast when it could deny safe access to its own coast by an enemy, using sea drones, diesel-electric subs, mines, and missiles, all for a fraction of the cost in dollars; manpower (a very scarce resource for a country with a population of only 27 million); and time compared to the AUKUS subs folly.
As Mick said, strategy starts with hard thinking. There’s not enough of it in this case, or by Israel against Hamas…
As an island continent, Australia is not in danger of being invaded by anyone. I doubt that the PLA is planning to invade Australia in the foreseeable future or in any future. I do think that Australia needs to focus on air defense systems in particular as well as naval power to protect is freedom of the seas and its lines of communication. But I do not see a great need for offensive ground forces
Gonzalo, Spot on! And I’d add more points.
“Long range” in European (Ukrainian) terms is up to, say, 1500kms. It is 1100km from Warsaw to Moscow; 760km Kyiv to Moscow. By contrast, Darwin to China is 6000km and to Jakarta is 2700km. There is simply no comparison between the theatres and therefore, between the strategic choices for the protagonists. This was why the Allies had to slowly and painfully island-hop to get within bomber range of Japan in WW2.
The Army will be irrelevant in any war with China. As Gonzalo said, it will not try to invade. It WILL seek to isolate and subjugate Australia into subservience. Australia’s best (indeed, only) strategy (apart from its alliances - a dangerous policy perhaps in the age of Trump) is to make itself a “prickly hedgehog”, deny sea access to its coastal littoral using submarines, missiles and maybe aircraft, and keep its sea lanes open for essential re-supply. It is self-sufficient in food and energy but needs imports for vital electronics and chips. All this calls into question the need for nuclear subs: why would Australia need to patrol the Chinese coast when it could deny safe access to its own coast by an enemy, using sea drones, diesel-electric subs, mines, and missiles, all for a fraction of the cost in dollars; manpower (a very scarce resource for a country with a population of only 27 million); and time compared to the AUKUS subs folly.
As Mick said, strategy starts with hard thinking. There’s not enough of it in this case, or by Israel against Hamas…
As an island continent, Australia is not in danger of being invaded by anyone. I doubt that the PLA is planning to invade Australia in the foreseeable future or in any future. I do think that Australia needs to focus on air defense systems in particular as well as naval power to protect is freedom of the seas and its lines of communication. But I do not see a great need for offensive ground forces