Ukraine will be getting Challenger 2, Leopard 2 and Abrams tanks. What are the implications of the provision of these modern, very capable main battle tanks to the Ukrainian Armed Forces?
Thanks Mick. I’ve been following your twitter threads for a few months now. Nice to hear your voice as well! Greetings from a very dark and rainy Scotland.
Thank you so much Mick Ryan for your time in explaining the issues surrounding battle tanks for Ukraine. It was very interesting and enlightening and certainly clarified the situation. I too have followed you for months and you always give a clear and concise picture to those of us supporting Ukraine. Bless you.
What is the average training time for a full crew to operate these tanks? Do they differ significantly from one model to another? Can a trained Challenger tank operator speed up a training process on a leopard? In other words, how long will it take Ukrainians to get ready to use them (providing their are at their disposal)
comments recently about extended fielding times to be expected in transition from older systems to the M1. Accompanying the comments were often scoffs of disbelief. The below attempts to explain the sea-change in logistics doctrine that fielding the M1 to units that have never experienced a future systems, will bring.
M1 extension delays will come with implementing the logistic systems required to keep the Tank's jet engine fed and repaired in a timely manner, as the support concepts and tools are significantly different from those that apply to a diesel engine. Training the log operators in the support of the new system is an intensive process. Unless the trainee is experienced in supporting jet aircraft, it's whole new world. Young trainees with little experience are relatively easy because they have few preconceptions. It's the old sergeants and warrant officers, experienced in repair the M60 (or other less-technically
advanced systems)
who bring their preconceptions with them. They MUST be trained to accept and support with those they supervise, the new ways of doing business.
Failure repair begins on the battlefield through use of unit diagostic computers, and remove-and-replace operations. Diagnostics tools identify unservicible modular major assembly components. Those assemblies are removed and replaced with a serviceable unit, normally by organizational mechanics. A Direct Support team operates on-site to address higher level requirements.
Removed unservicible component are evacuated back, via scheduled DS transport, to the supporting DS level unit for detailed computer analysis and occasional repair. Most high-value components are further evacuated to higher-level (Corp) GS units (or contractor) for repair and return to DS units for future repair ("float") requirements. Those are the source for future repairs. (Again, returns travel by scheduled higher-level transport.)
Modular assemblies are extremely expensive, and are accouted for as we would normally account for primary systems (rifles, vehicles, night vision devices, etc.) The maintennce system is designed to put combat systems back into ready status extremely quickly through the use of forward diagostic computers, remove-replace-evac operations supported by a combination of organizational and Direct Support maintenance teams, with further repair completed at Corps or higher level units (or by contractor organizations operating in the theater of operations.)
All is supported by transport systems operating with dependable, scheduled deliveries.
I above only addressed maintenance operations concepts for the M1. Of equal interest are the speed and frequency of logistics operations required by M1. It's consumption rates of unque fuel are significant. Distances and frequency for re-arm/refuel operations are extended in combat operations. Unit fuel (and ammo) transport vehicle fleets need to be able to accommodate operational requirements and the terrain of the operation. US logistics doctrine calls for rearm/refuel operations to occur one major terrain feature behind operating combat units. Experience has validated that doctrine as one of the techniques necessary to keep the log units satisfactorily available to empeloyed M1 units. Old system box cargo trucks and refuel trucks frequently cannot meet operator requirements. The US Army determined that those requirements were sufficiently important as to require a new fleet of organizational and DS trucks designed for forward, rapid support.
M1 system weight will demand detailed route recons and, occasionally, engineer support to resolve issues created
by bridges and road surfaces that don't meet the demands of the Tank's weight. (We had to have several bridges rebuilt by the German governmenf between our units' home deployment station and our assigned wartime area of operations.)
The Tank is a marvelous weapons system, but it brings with it a demand for rethinking how we do business...operational or logistical. It requires a mind-set change (with associated training and leader development) to fully appreciate what it brings to the fight.
Thanks for this very informative response, very interesting.
I do wonder if M1s are more of a gesture than an actual tanks that would have to operate? May be they will, don’t know. They said Germany sends 14 but is it really 14?
In the same time, Ukrainian turned out to be very adaptable (to my own disbelief as I was born and raised there and never seen such a brilliance in execution). I guess once your survival is at stake, you do learn how to do things right unite quickly.
What about the training for leopards? Do you know how long would they take them?
Absolutely agree with your observation of brilliance in execution. Their adaptation to operation of the HMMET (sp?) should serve as a case study; When Poland starts to get their newly-requested systems, the new-systems operator training should be provided by Ukrainian gunners! They are fantastic.
My concern is the US says its trying to convert the AFU to a maneuver army from the ancient soviet 'gun god' artillery army but a maneuver army requires at least local air cover and strike power.
Ukraine only has a few dozen fighter / bombers left - how can Ukraine launcher a maneuver (mechanized) counter offensive without local air cover?
Any new jets let alone Western types like the F16 would seem to many months off at earliest.
I also believe the way you do. I can make a substantial argument for A10 and AH64 aviation support over fast movers but this forum is probably not the appropriate place for that fight.
General Ryan, THANKS for this concise analysis. I would appreciate a subsequent episode on how all of the new weapons flowing to Ukraine (Tanks + AFV + SPGs, etc.) are likely to be employed at the tactical level. Any recommendations on books that describe the latest “combined arms operations” would also be appreciated.
Thoughts on issues/ challenges for Ukr to operate and support three different types of Western MTBs? Will they come with respective support packages (based in Poland?)
Has anyone figured out how to retain (copy/paste) a copy of that you've written?
I spent about 4 hours preparing an extensive reply as to WHY it takes longer to train and equip logisticians to support (maintain, repair, refuel and rearm) the M1. I now have the equivalent of an on app-only .pdf of my document. I can't seem to post or copy it. Help!
Thank you for war shorts! It's good that you mentioned the psychological boost this will be for Ukrainians to fight on, as they must, even if the tanks take time to get there and time to get up to speed on using them. Putin will of course have a reaction OR this tank decision by the reluctant West is a consequence already of Putin's intentions... and so we ratchet up for Spring.
Thanks Mick. I’ve been following your twitter threads for a few months now. Nice to hear your voice as well! Greetings from a very dark and rainy Scotland.
Thanks. I hope you will get to hear it more.
Thank you so much Mick Ryan for your time in explaining the issues surrounding battle tanks for Ukraine. It was very interesting and enlightening and certainly clarified the situation. I too have followed you for months and you always give a clear and concise picture to those of us supporting Ukraine. Bless you.
Thanks for this Mick. It's great to get some expert context. More please.
Very informative, General. More, please!
Is there a way to get a transcript? I’m Deaf, thanks. Thanks for all you do!
Hi Rebecca. Let me check into how I might do this.
I'm waiting for the same, response
Well done.
Thank you for this short podcast, very useful.
What is the average training time for a full crew to operate these tanks? Do they differ significantly from one model to another? Can a trained Challenger tank operator speed up a training process on a leopard? In other words, how long will it take Ukrainians to get ready to use them (providing their are at their disposal)
I've heard numerous
comments recently about extended fielding times to be expected in transition from older systems to the M1. Accompanying the comments were often scoffs of disbelief. The below attempts to explain the sea-change in logistics doctrine that fielding the M1 to units that have never experienced a future systems, will bring.
M1 extension delays will come with implementing the logistic systems required to keep the Tank's jet engine fed and repaired in a timely manner, as the support concepts and tools are significantly different from those that apply to a diesel engine. Training the log operators in the support of the new system is an intensive process. Unless the trainee is experienced in supporting jet aircraft, it's whole new world. Young trainees with little experience are relatively easy because they have few preconceptions. It's the old sergeants and warrant officers, experienced in repair the M60 (or other less-technically
advanced systems)
who bring their preconceptions with them. They MUST be trained to accept and support with those they supervise, the new ways of doing business.
Failure repair begins on the battlefield through use of unit diagostic computers, and remove-and-replace operations. Diagnostics tools identify unservicible modular major assembly components. Those assemblies are removed and replaced with a serviceable unit, normally by organizational mechanics. A Direct Support team operates on-site to address higher level requirements.
Removed unservicible component are evacuated back, via scheduled DS transport, to the supporting DS level unit for detailed computer analysis and occasional repair. Most high-value components are further evacuated to higher-level (Corp) GS units (or contractor) for repair and return to DS units for future repair ("float") requirements. Those are the source for future repairs. (Again, returns travel by scheduled higher-level transport.)
Modular assemblies are extremely expensive, and are accouted for as we would normally account for primary systems (rifles, vehicles, night vision devices, etc.) The maintennce system is designed to put combat systems back into ready status extremely quickly through the use of forward diagostic computers, remove-replace-evac operations supported by a combination of organizational and Direct Support maintenance teams, with further repair completed at Corps or higher level units (or by contractor organizations operating in the theater of operations.)
All is supported by transport systems operating with dependable, scheduled deliveries.
I above only addressed maintenance operations concepts for the M1. Of equal interest are the speed and frequency of logistics operations required by M1. It's consumption rates of unque fuel are significant. Distances and frequency for re-arm/refuel operations are extended in combat operations. Unit fuel (and ammo) transport vehicle fleets need to be able to accommodate operational requirements and the terrain of the operation. US logistics doctrine calls for rearm/refuel operations to occur one major terrain feature behind operating combat units. Experience has validated that doctrine as one of the techniques necessary to keep the log units satisfactorily available to empeloyed M1 units. Old system box cargo trucks and refuel trucks frequently cannot meet operator requirements. The US Army determined that those requirements were sufficiently important as to require a new fleet of organizational and DS trucks designed for forward, rapid support.
M1 system weight will demand detailed route recons and, occasionally, engineer support to resolve issues created
by bridges and road surfaces that don't meet the demands of the Tank's weight. (We had to have several bridges rebuilt by the German governmenf between our units' home deployment station and our assigned wartime area of operations.)
The Tank is a marvelous weapons system, but it brings with it a demand for rethinking how we do business...operational or logistical. It requires a mind-set change (with associated training and leader development) to fully appreciate what it brings to the fight.
Thanks for this very informative response, very interesting.
I do wonder if M1s are more of a gesture than an actual tanks that would have to operate? May be they will, don’t know. They said Germany sends 14 but is it really 14?
In the same time, Ukrainian turned out to be very adaptable (to my own disbelief as I was born and raised there and never seen such a brilliance in execution). I guess once your survival is at stake, you do learn how to do things right unite quickly.
What about the training for leopards? Do you know how long would they take them?
Absolutely agree with your observation of brilliance in execution. Their adaptation to operation of the HMMET (sp?) should serve as a case study; When Poland starts to get their newly-requested systems, the new-systems operator training should be provided by Ukrainian gunners! They are fantastic.
Tom
My concern is the US says its trying to convert the AFU to a maneuver army from the ancient soviet 'gun god' artillery army but a maneuver army requires at least local air cover and strike power.
Ukraine only has a few dozen fighter / bombers left - how can Ukraine launcher a maneuver (mechanized) counter offensive without local air cover?
Any new jets let alone Western types like the F16 would seem to many months off at earliest.
Also every time I've logged into FD it asks me to reregister including when I merely want to make a comment.
Must be some control in the admin console but permissions are tricky in apps like these in my experience - good luck and thanks for the insight.
I also believe the way you do. I can make a substantial argument for A10 and AH64 aviation support over fast movers but this forum is probably not the appropriate place for that fight.
Tom
General Ryan, THANKS for this concise analysis. I would appreciate a subsequent episode on how all of the new weapons flowing to Ukraine (Tanks + AFV + SPGs, etc.) are likely to be employed at the tactical level. Any recommendations on books that describe the latest “combined arms operations” would also be appreciated.
Could Poland be donating their first batch of M1's to Ukraine?
"on 1 December 2021, the Polish Armed Forces General Command announced that 28 tanks will be delivered by the end of 2022." - https://www.overtdefense.com/2022/01/17/update-on-polands-abrams-procurement/
Thoughts on issues/ challenges for Ukr to operate and support three different types of Western MTBs? Will they come with respective support packages (based in Poland?)
They MUST! The support concept assumes appropriate mobility, tools and trained soldiers.
Has anyone figured out how to retain (copy/paste) a copy of that you've written?
I spent about 4 hours preparing an extensive reply as to WHY it takes longer to train and equip logisticians to support (maintain, repair, refuel and rearm) the M1. I now have the equivalent of an on app-only .pdf of my document. I can't seem to post or copy it. Help!
Let me check into how I can do this.
Please do. Thanks, Tom
Thank you for war shorts! It's good that you mentioned the psychological boost this will be for Ukrainians to fight on, as they must, even if the tanks take time to get there and time to get up to speed on using them. Putin will of course have a reaction OR this tank decision by the reluctant West is a consequence already of Putin's intentions... and so we ratchet up for Spring.
Very interesting!
Thanks
I might have half an answer to my question about air cover
https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1617868545731465217?s=20&t=KqYInoYukP9whyXMUU6dGg
Thanks Mick, great commentary and a good education for me. Looking forward to more episodes as you post them.