Ukraine Gets Long Range ATACMs

It will enhance its capacity for operational strike, but is not a silver bullet

Image: Missile Threats at CSIS

It has been revealed that the U.S. quietly provided the longer range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMs) missile – fired from the wheeled HiMARS and tracked MLRS launchers – at the direction of President Biden

This represents yet another Russian failure to anticipate, given that in February this year, US news agencies reported that the White House was ready to provide Ukraine with longer-range ATACMS missile variants if the U.S. Congress approved new funding for Ukraine.

The missiles were used for the first time on 17 April against a Russian airfield in Crimea around 170 km from the Ukrainian front lines. Four Russian S-400 launchers, three radar stations, a command post for air defense operations, and air space surveillance equipment Fundament-M were destroyed in the attack, according to Ukraine's military intelligence.

Ukraine used the ATACMs a second time in the past 48 hours against Russian forces in the south-eastern region of Ukraine.

According to one source, the variant of the missile provided by the U.S. and used in the most recent strikes is one of about 100 Long-Range Versions of the MGM-140 ATACMS. Open sources report the range of the Block 1A variant at 300km.

In a Reuters article on this topic it was noted that White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan informed reporters during a press briefing that a "significant number" of the missiles had been sent to Ukraine and said "we will send more."

Back in the second half of 2023, the United States supplied Ukraine with a shorter range variant version of the ATACMS. Containing cluster munitions that can travel 100 miles.

But Ukraine has been seeking longer range versions of the missile. Why is that?

Operational Impact

The new missiles provide several important capabilities for the Ukrainians.

The most obvious one is that it enhances their ability to conduct operational strike. I recently wrote about the issue of Ukraine’s strategic strike complexes and how there was a deficit of focus on operational strike. In essence, operational strike encompasses those actions which degrade the size, quality and cohesion of a fighting force while they are deployed in theatre but before they are committed to combat.

It is particularly important when facing an enemy that is much larger than friendly forces. This was a dilemma that NATO faced during the Cold War. One element of the U.S response then was the Assault Breaker program, which sought to move beyond the attack of massed second and third echelon Soviet forces with crewed aircraft. These strike operations were to be complemented with a variety of new technologies for ISR and strike.

A doctrinal element that complemented Assault Breaker, from the U.S. Army, was Air Land Battle. This was an important shift from a historic focus on tactical activities (winning battles) to a more operational focus. For friendly forces, this incorporated rapid movement of forces, avoiding decisive confrontations with the adversary forces and a synchronised use of combat power for the deep and close fights. And it meant a wider range of weapon systems to hit the Soviet forces in the deep battle.

ATACMS variants. Image: Image: @ColbyBadhwar at Twitter / X

This included hitting the types of targets in the deep battle that Ukraine can now hit with the longer range ATACMs provided by the U.S. This includes air defence, logistics, headquarters and reserve troop concentrations. The main aim of Air Land Battle – and for the Ukrainians now – is to ensure that when they are engaged in ground combat, the Ukrainians don’t face an enemy with superior numbers. Indeed, the acme of ground combat is shaping the battlespace so friendly forces always outnumber the enemy in battle.

Providing the new variants of ATACMS in secret was smart. It surprises the Russians (even though their provision was telegraphed months ago) which increases the weapon’s effectiveness.

The provision of these weapons also complicates the air defence operations of the Russians. It adds another layer of complexity to the air defence command and control, and places at risk the radars, launchers and C2 elements of deployed air defence systems that have been relatively safe until now.

The new longer range ATACMs will drive another round of tactical and operational adaptation from the Russians. They will need to rethink their logistic support to front line forces, and potentially move some (but not all) logistics units and infrastructure further away from the tactical formations they support.These changes will also complicate the planning and execution of current Russian offensive activity in the east and south of Ukraine.

Finally, these weapons will also have an impact on the forecast Russian step up in offensive operations in the coming months which was discussed recently by intelligence chief, General Budanov. He has been quoted stating that “Russia will launch its offensive at the end of May or in June.

Therefore, the provision of these weapons, and the large surge of U.S. assistance just announced by the U.S., will be forcing Russian strategic and operational planners to rethink their future operations.

According to the Russian Defence Minister, part of their response will be to increase the Russian strike campaign against Ukrainian logistics and supply lines to destroy Western weapons and munitions before they reach the front line. However, like most Shoigu pronouncements, this is mainly fantasy. The Russians have had 26 months to conduct a significant campaign against these supply lines and have not made a significant impact. To do so now would compromise all their other strike operations and given the nature of the thousands of targets involved, probably have a minimal impact.

The Russians may have a narrow window of opportunity to step up their tactical operations now. However, even with the Ukrainians’ vastly undermanned and under gunned along the front line at present, the Russians have found it difficult to mass and advance significant distances. Even when they have taken ground, it has come at a huge cost.

A Ukrainian army that is resupplied with air defence and artillery munitions, and with the increase in morale that has accompanied the U.S aid bill approval, will make any expansion in Russian offensive operations in the coming months very difficult indeed.

Escalation?

This is an inevitable question that will be posed by some. Will the provision of these missiles be an escalation of the war?

In short, no. Russia has been using longer range strike weapons throughout the war. And, in the past few months Russia has also used KN-23 ballistic missiles supplied by North Korea (range: 690km), which was apparently a contributing factor to the decision by the U.S. administration to supply this most recent batch of ATACMs missiles.

As Illia Ponomarenko notes:

Believe it or not, the sky did not fall on Earth, there was no "WW3," no boiling seas, no 40 years of darkness, no earthquakes, no volcanos, no mass hysteria, and no cats and dogs living together. What happened was Ukraine, as a result of a precise ATACMS strike, wiping out advanced Russian air defense systems in occupied Crimea.

The tragedy is that these new missiles, and many other armaments used by Ukraine, have consistently been provided later than they should have because of ‘escalation terror’ among some Western politicians.

The argument that the provision of these missiles now will have an escalatory impact on the war is without merit.

An Important Development – But Not a Silver Bullet

The new ATACMs are an important new capability for the Ukrainians. It enhances their capacity for operational strike and complicates ground and air defence operations for the Russians.

But, like all weapons, the new, longer range ATACMS are no silver bullet. They will be an important component in Ukraine’s operational strike capability but will need to be used judiciously to ensure their best effect and to slow Russian adaptation to them.

While the Russians may eventually adapt to the impact of these weapons, as they have shown in the wake of new weapons being introduced, they are an important capability for Ukraine.