I am tempted indeed to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working on now, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter that they have got it wrong. What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives.
Sir Michael Howard, Military Science in an Age of Peace, 1973
Frequent readers of my work, here at Futura Doctrina or in my other publications such as my 2022 book, War Transformed, will have recognised that one of the central themes of my examination of the phenomenon of war – and the war in Ukraine in particular – is the concept of adaptation.
Exploration of the theory of adaptation has its origins in early advances in the biological sciences. English naturalist, geologist, and biologist, Charles Darwin, produced a theory of evolution. This theory explored the causal mechanism to account for evolutionary changes in the natural world. Darwin, with his theory of natural selection, sought to understand and describe how new animal species emerge and how others disappear in nature.
The exploration of adaptation has resulted in the development of concepts that underpin understanding of how adaptation occurs and how it can be applied. In military literature, the best-known adaptive cycle is Colonel John Boyd’s OODA (observe-orient-decide-act) loop.
In the 21st century, adaptation research has shifted well beyond the work of Charles Darwin and John Boyd. Adaptation theory is now applied across a variety of scientific endeavours. The theory of adaptation has become important in the examination of the optimum organisation of societies, businesses and other organisations as they attempt to improve their effectiveness in changing environments.
The breadth of change, and the speed at which it is occurring, must be considered to ensure all levels of military institutions are open to opportunities and resistant to the effects of surprise. Regardless of industry, the generation of a competitive advantage in an era where change is rapid is becoming more difficult. When an advantage is generated, it is likely to be more fleeting than in previous ages. As Rita McGrath wrote in a Harvard Business Review article, we now exist in an era of transient advantage and that successful institutions must spark continuous change and avoid the rigidity that leads to failure.
The transient nature of sources of advantage means that nations need to pursue approaches that harness all aspects of national capacity. To retain relevance and remain at the forefront of best practices, military organizations must possess and continuously update their mechanisms for environmental scanning and adaptation. Generating diverse options within military organisations, and in the wider national security community, is crucial to sustaining a competitive edge on the battlefield and beyond in the twenty-first century. As Peter Schwartz notes in The Art of the Long View, “resilient companies continually hold strategic conversations about the future.”
Adaptation in War
It is unreasonable to expect military institutions and their leaders to foresee every possible future contingency or to predict the reactions of an enemy. There is an infinite array of interactions and situations to consider, even in the smallest tactical actions. The Clausewitzian idea about the fog of war is as relevant today in the digital age as it was when he wrote On War two centuries ago. Because of this, an important design feature, and cultural stance, for military organizations in peace and war must be the ability to learn, and to be able to adapt to unexpected events.
In war, those who plan and lead the fighting must constantly seek to outthink, out-maneuver and to out-fight the other side. New technological innovations are introduced into service, the geography or objectives in the war are expanded or evolved, and new tactical and operational concepts are developed to exploit evolving organisational constructs and achieve evolving theories of victory. This constitutes, as I explored in War Transformed and other articles, an Adaptation Battle.
This adaptation battle has been taking place throughout the war in Ukraine. Both sides offer lessons in how contemporary military institutions might develop and sustain the learning culture that underpins adaptation – and success - at every level of military operations.
There are multiple examples of adaptation – from tactical to strategic levels – by both sides in this war. In the Ukrainian offensives so far, there is an example of tactical adaptation with the Ukrainian Ground Forces starting to use dismounted, distributed minefield breaching instead of heavy, mounted breach operations. The recent article in The Economist on this topic by Oliver Carroll was excellent.
Operationally, the Ukrainians appear to be adapting their main effort between the east and the south, possibly deceiving the Russians about follow-on phases for their offensives.
At the same time, the Russians have also been adapting. An important adaptation has been their response to the introduction of HIMARS in mid 2022. Since then, the Russian have evolved their C2 and logistics to make it harder to target and more survivable, which will complicate the Ukrainian deep battle in their 2023 offensive. They also adapted their operational posture to assume a more defensive stance in the south and the east, including the massive construction of obstacles and minefields.
Some of my previous articles on the topic of adaptation in the Ukraine War include:
The State of the Ukrainian 2023 Campaign – 2 August 2023
500 Days of Learning – 10 July 2023
Ukraine and the Rise of Robotic Ground Combat – 20 June 2023
Striking Further: Ukrainian Adaptation During the War Against Russia – 30 May 2023
Operational Adaptation by the Russians – 11 May 2023
Learning from the War in Ukraine – 19 December 2022
Winning the Adaptation Battle – 12 December 2022
A military organization’s learning capacity, and the ability to share lessons across the institution, is at the heart of every successful military organisation. Whether it is pre-war innovation, tactical learning, or the constant adaptation to military strategy during a war, learning and adapting is an essential component in military operations.
The competitive learning environment of military operations reinforces the requirement to develop and exploit the adaptive processes of military institutions. This adaptation occurs at multiple levels. It takes place with individuals at the individual level, and occurs at many levels in units, formations, and commands within military organisations.
But as Cohen and Gooch explore in their excellent book, Military Misfortunes, not all learning or adaptation in wartime results in battlefield success. Part of this is because some institutions are not able to quickly or efficiently absorb new technologies – or ideas. Alternatively, some fail to anticipate the array of future threats or are unable to judge which threats are the most serious. A final cause for adaptive failure is that enemies actively seek to interfere with and degrade their opponent’s ability to learn and adapt.
Adaptation and Organizational Learning Cultures
One of the most important institutional responsibilities of senior leaders in military and national security institutions is providing the incentives for innovation during peace time. This allows appropriate organisational constructs and leading-edge technology to be combined to provide an advantage against adversaries in war.
It does however require a cultural predisposition to learning and sharing lessons widely, accepting failure as an opportunity to learn, and a well-honed understanding of risk. In his book, The Culture of Military Innovation, Dima Adamsky writes of these prerequisites for adaptation, describing how:
In the future, both state and non-state actors will continue to develop military knowledge, and security experts will continue to uncover foreign military innovations. In each case there will be a need to figure out the tools of war (hardware) and anticipate their application (software). The task with regard to “software” will be much more demanding, and a cultural approach will be indispensable for it.
War is a learning opportunity for military institutions. But to exploit learning and adapt, some knowledge of the theory of adaptation and its application to military institutions is required.
To that end, I present below a list of some of the best book and publications on adaptation and its application to the profession of arms. I am certain that there are probably some books not on the list that should be there. However, these are the publications I have found most useful over three decades of study of war and the military profession. Enjoy!
The List
Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the U.S., and Israel, Stanford Security Studies, 2010.
Dima Adamsky and Kjell Inge Bjerga (eds), Contemporary Military Innovation: Between Anticipation and Adaptation, Routledge, 2012.
Alexei Arbatov, The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya. Marshall Center Papers, No. 2., The Marshall Center, 2000.
Australian Army. Adaptive Campaigning, Australian Army, 2006.
Robert Axelrod and Michael Cohen, Harnessing Complexity: Organizational Implications of a Scientific Frontier, Basic Books, 2000.
Nora Bensahel and David Barno, Adaptation Under Fire: How Militaries Change in Wartime, Oxford University Press, 2020.
Scott Berkun, The Myths of Innovation, O’Reilly, 2010.
Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle. Princeton University Press, 2006.
Max Boot, War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today, Gotham Books, 2006.
John Boyd, Patterns of Conflict: Warp XII. Unpublished briefing. Alfred Gray Research Center Archives.
Risa Brooks and Elizabeth Stanley, eds. Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness, Stanford University Press, 2007.
Serena Chad, A Revolution in Military Adaptation: The US Army in the Iraq War. Georgetown University Press, 2011.
Michael Chase, et al. China’s Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). RAND Corporation, 2015.
Eliot Cohen and John Gooch. Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War, Vintage Books, 1990.
James Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, University Press of Kansas, 1992.
Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species: By Means of Natural Selection or The Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life, Random House reprint, 1998.
Daniel Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life, Penguin Books, 1995.
Norman Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence. Basic Books, 1976.
Trevor Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare. Da Capo Press, 1984.
Theo Farrell, Sten Rynning and Terry Terriff, Transforming Military Power since the Cold War: Britain, France, and the United States, 1991–2012, Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Theo Farrell, Military Adaptation in Afghanistan, Stanford Security Studies, 2013.
Meir Finkel, On Flexibility: Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on the Battlefield. Stanford University Press, 2007.
Meir Finkel, Military Agility: Ensuring Rapid and Effective Transition from Peace to War. University of Kentucky Press, 2020.
Aimee Fox, Learning to Fight: Military Innovation and Change in the British Army, 1914–1918, Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Anne-Marie Grisogono, “Success and Failure in Adaptation.” Paper for the Sixth International Conference on Complex Systems, Boston, 25–30 June 2006.
Bruce Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918. Praeger, 1989.
Grant Hammond, The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security, Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001.
Frank Hoffman, Mars Adapting: Military Change During War. Naval Institute Press, 2021.
Michael Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power. Princeton University Press, 2010.
Michael Horowitz and Shira Pindyck, “What is a military innovation and why it matters”, Journal of Strategic Studies 46, No. 1 (2023), 97-98.
Michael Horowitz and Stephen Rosen, “Evolution or Revolution?”, Journal of Strategic Studies 28, No. 3 (2005), 437-448.
Michael Howard, “Military Science in an Age of Peace.” RUSI Journal 119, no. 1 (March 1974): 3–11.
David Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917–1945. Cornell University Press, 2003.
MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, eds. The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050. Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Margarita Konaev and Owen J. Daniels. “Agile Ukraine, Lumbering Russia: The Promise and Limits of Military Adaptation”. Foreign Affairs, 28 March 2023.
Andrew Krepinevich, The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002.
Andrew Krepinevich, The Origins of Victory: How Disruptive Military Innovation Determines the Fates of Great Powers, Yale University Press, 2023.
Sean McFate, The New Rules of War: Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder. William Morrow, 2019.
Allan Millett and Williamson Murray (eds). Military Effectiveness, vol. 1: The First World War. Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Williamson Murray, Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change. Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Williamson Murray, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period. Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Rita McGrath, “Transient Advantage.” Harvard Business Review, June 2013. https://hbr.org/2013/06/transient-advantage.
Michael O’Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare. Brookings Institution, 2000.
Kenneth Payne, Strategy, Evolution and War: From Apes to Artificial Intelligence, Georgetown University Press, 2018.
Stephen Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military. Cornell University Press, 1991.
Mick Ryan, “How Ukraine is winning in the adaptation battle against Russia” Engelsberg Ideas, 24 August 2022, https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/how-ukraine-is-winning-in-the-adaptation-battle-against-russia/
Mick Ryan, “Implementing an Adaptive Approach in Non-Kinetic Counterinsurgency Operations.” Australian Army Journal IV, no. 3 (2007): 125–40.
Peter Schwartz, The Art of the Long View. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, 1991.
Richard Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare. Lancer Publishers, 1997.
Don Starry, “To Change an Army”, Military Review, March 1983, 20-27.
Karl Weick and Kathleen Sutcliffe. Managing the Unexpected: Assuring High Performance in an Age of Complexity. Jossey-Bass, 2001.
Thank you for all of your thinking and dissemination of ideas regarding organizational adaptation and learning. To see this placed in a military and diplomatic context has been instructive for me in thinking about these challenges in my work life in the energy and environmental space with power and gas. You bring a perspective to the Russian invasion of Ukraine as well as potential future that is truly unique.
I appreciate the links you include, led me to read an learn on topics I’d mostly left behind when I retired. And I’ll just agree with Paul’s much better stated comment as I’m a bit foggy today.