Ukraine’s key is to continue to attrit Russian forces behind the defensive lines through HMARS, Storm Shadow, artillery. Logistics and ammo dumps have short lives behind the Surovikin line. Eventually the defensive wall will be hollowed out so long a Ukraine has ammunition. Then the breakthrough becomes easier. But the hollowing out of the defensive positions take time. In this sense this is likely the best outcome Gerasimov could hope for. And keep in mind Ukraine has retaken more territory in 7 weeks than Russia could capture in a year.
I strongly suspect that brigades are too large as presently organized to cope with pervasive surveillance and prompt fires. The much-reported issues with coordination could easily be misunderstanding the nature of what's happening - NATO training even of mid-level officers simply won't be able to reflect the new battlefield reality until curricula are dramatically updated.
A lot of NATO pros seem to be trying to scapegoat Ukraine for not proving that NATO doctrine and gear is magic. This is a different kind of battlefield than anyone has ever experienced before, and a lot of established old hands don't want to see a lifetime of investment in certain kinds of kit and gear prove to be a mistake.
Kind of wondering if NATO isn't in the position of the RAF back in the 1930s, flying a zoo of sometimes truly weird aircraft that didn't work well together. Then things got more standardized as lessons were learned in 1940-1941. A coherent theory developed.
My bet is that the future of warfare sees smaller teams overall. I wonder if the future base-level operational unit be a team of 6-10 armored vehicles and up to 100 personnel, basic task to slowly infiltrate forward across a 5km or even 10km front backed by massed precision fires...
Sort of unfortunate Ukraieb can't introduce ground forces as any point *behind* the Surokivn line. This isn't actually WWI; there do exist paratroopers and even air-drop aircraft. All that would be needed is anti-air suppression.
Ukraine’s key is to continue to attrit Russian forces behind the defensive lines through HMARS, Storm Shadow, artillery. Logistics and ammo dumps have short lives behind the Surovikin line. Eventually the defensive wall will be hollowed out so long a Ukraine has ammunition. Then the breakthrough becomes easier. But the hollowing out of the defensive positions take time. In this sense this is likely the best outcome Gerasimov could hope for. And keep in mind Ukraine has retaken more territory in 7 weeks than Russia could capture in a year.
I strongly suspect that brigades are too large as presently organized to cope with pervasive surveillance and prompt fires. The much-reported issues with coordination could easily be misunderstanding the nature of what's happening - NATO training even of mid-level officers simply won't be able to reflect the new battlefield reality until curricula are dramatically updated.
A lot of NATO pros seem to be trying to scapegoat Ukraine for not proving that NATO doctrine and gear is magic. This is a different kind of battlefield than anyone has ever experienced before, and a lot of established old hands don't want to see a lifetime of investment in certain kinds of kit and gear prove to be a mistake.
Kind of wondering if NATO isn't in the position of the RAF back in the 1930s, flying a zoo of sometimes truly weird aircraft that didn't work well together. Then things got more standardized as lessons were learned in 1940-1941. A coherent theory developed.
My bet is that the future of warfare sees smaller teams overall. I wonder if the future base-level operational unit be a team of 6-10 armored vehicles and up to 100 personnel, basic task to slowly infiltrate forward across a 5km or even 10km front backed by massed precision fires...
Sort of unfortunate Ukraieb can't introduce ground forces as any point *behind* the Surokivn line. This isn't actually WWI; there do exist paratroopers and even air-drop aircraft. All that would be needed is anti-air suppression.