The Big Five - 14 December edition

My regular update on conflict and confrontation in Ukraine, the Middle East and the Pacific, accompanied by recommended readings on modern war and future conflict.

Source: @DefenceU and @GeneralStaffUA

If leaders fear responding or become accustomed to terror, Putin sees it as permission to continue…Putin won’t be stopped by empty talk—strength is what is needed to bring peace. Strength that is not afraid of its ability to confront and stop evil. President Zelenskyy, 13 December 2024

2024 is drawing to a violent conclusion. This week, I cover the normal range of conflicts, starting with Ukraine, then the Middle East and finally across the world to the Pacific Theatre.

And, as always, I will finish with my five recommended reads on war and national security issues from the past week.

Ukraine

Peace Negotiations. This week, the Russian foreign ministry reinforced (again) that is was not interested in any negotiation over Ukraine that did not see it achieve its key objectives about Ukraine not being in NATO, no NATO forces in Ukraine. They also raised the old narrative about Ukraine’s Russian-speaking population; a large proportion of Ukrainians speak Russian, including the president. It doesn’t mean that they want to be Russian. Just because I speak English, it doesn’t mean I want to be British.

A Russian spokesperson this week stated that "firstly, Russia is acting. Secondly, if someone expects Russia to make some kind of concessions, apparently these people have a short memory and insufficient knowledge of the matter…Putin's proposals for peace needed to be implemented.”

Also this week on the matter of peace negotiations, the French President visited Poland and pitched a European ceasefire monitoring force for Ukraine. The visit was cut short because Macron had to return to Paris to appoint a new prime minister. And in the wake of the visit, Polish prime minister Donald Tusk appeared to shoot down the idea of the ceasefire monitoring force when he noted that "I want to cut short speculation on the presence of troops from this or that country in Ukraine after a possible peace agreement or in the case of a cease-fire.” There is a long way to go before even a ceasefire is possible.

Finally, it appears that the incoming Trump administration is already holding discussions with the current Biden administration and Ukrainian officials about a potential ceasefire and peace deal. NBC News reported that discussions took place during the recent visit to the U.S. by the head of the Ukrainian President's Office, Andrii Yermak. As of yet, there are no concrete proposals from the Trump administration on how to achieve their objective of a ceasefire in Ukraine.

Yermak this week stated that "there is no plan yet, and we have not seen it for sure. We know that several opinions and positions are being discussed." He also noted that Ukraine won’t enter negotiations with Russia at present because it lacks sufficient Western support to engage from a position of strength.

Ultimately, when it comes to peace negotiations, Russia is not interested in serious discussions about Ukraine other than under its terms. And, it is unlikely to abide by any agreement that is eventually struck.

Strategic Strike Campaigns. Both Ukraine and Russian continued their respective strategic strike campaigns against each other.

Ukraine this week struck Russial oil facilities near the city of Oryol. The fire there reportedly burned out of control for several days. On 11 December, Ukraine also launched an ATACMs missile strike against Beriev aviation plant in Taganrog in the Rostov region of Russia. The strike is also reported to have included Ukrainian long-range drones, former Soviet S-200 air-defense missiles modified for land strike missions, and possibly even the new Ukrainian turbojet-powered Palianytsia missile.

Ukrainian forces also executed a drone strike against Russian forces in occupied Crimea on the evening of 11 December.

This week data also emerged that recent Ukrainian strikes on Russian munitions depots, and the threat posed to Russian aircraft now within range of Ukrainian ATACMs missiles, may have had an impact on the availability of Russian glide bombs. A report in the Kyiv Independent notes that “Russian aircraft have launched fewer guided bombs on Ukraine in the first 12 days of December. The number of bombs topped 50 on only five days, according to the General Staff. The average number of bombs per day is now 40 or fewer.”

Imagine what might have been acheived had the permission to use these longer range U.S. weapons been given earlier in the war.

It appears the president-elect is not happy about the recent change in U.S. policy on the use of long range weapons. In his interview with Time this week, he noted that "I disagree very vehemently with sending missiles hundreds of miles into Russia. Why are we doing that? We’re just escalating this war and making it worse." He has much to learn about war, and the differences between negotiating a business deal and signalling resolve to a determined enemy. And, any negotiation needs to provide a secure, just and enduring peace for Ukraine, and not enable future Russian aggression.

On 13 December, Russia launched a massive aerial attack against Ukraine's energy infrastructure. Approximately 290 missiles and drones were targeted across multiple regions in Ukraine. Some of the missiles were intercepted and shot down by Ukraine’s recently acquired F16 fighter jets. This latest assault continues the Russian acceleration of its aerial operations against Ukraine. Compared to the same time in 2023 and 2022, the current Russian air, missile and drone attacks are much larger in scale and scope (see CSIS graph below).

Source: CSIS

A statement from the Ukrainian energy operator Ukrenergo described now energy facilities in multiple regions were attacked and damaged. The statement also noted that repairs are being conducted but the degree of damage means that emergency shutdowns will increase.

The Financial Times has reported that Russia is considering launching its new intermediate-range ballistic missile Oreshnik at Ukraine for the second time this weekend. The first use of this missile against Ukraine occured on 21 November this year.

The Ground War. In Kursk, Ukrainian forces continue their grim task of holding onto Russian terrain in the face of Russian and North Korean assaults. Newsweek reported this week that between 6 and 7 December, North Korean troops captured the town of Plekhovo from Ukrainian ground forces. Russian forces have also advanced in the north western section of the Kursk salient, recapturing Darino and Novoivanovka (both southeast of Korenevo). Overall however, there has been little change in the control of territory in Kursk.

Changes in control of Kursk, 7 to 12 December 2024. Source: ISW

In eastern Ukraine, Ukrainian forces this week regained lost positions near Svatove while fighting continues along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line. Russian forces were able achieve small advances in the vicinity of Chasiv Yar, as part of the larger Russian offensive on that axis of advance.

Russian forces continued attacks in the vicinity of Toretsk, without any gains in terrain. However, on the Pokrovsk axis of advance, the Russians made gains over the past week. The most recent report from the Institute for the Study of War noted that:

A Ukrainian brigade spokesperson operating in the Pokrovsk direction noted that recent Russian advances place Russian forces about six to ten kilometers away from the outskirts of Pokrovsk and that Russian forces are trying to break through to Pokrovsk via its left and right flanks in order to avoid assaulting the town head-on.

Finally, it has been reported that the commander of the Donetsk Joint Task Force, Oleksandr Lutsenko, has been dismissed after the rapid advance of the Russians towards Pokrovsk. Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi has apparently been appointed to his position.

Middle East

In the Middle East, a variety of events have occured as a result of the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. There have been many, many articles on how bad this is for Russia and Iran. I would exercise some sensible caution about these predictions. We heard similar predictions about Russia after their failure in the Battle of Kyiv in 2022 and in the wake of the Prigozhin mutiny of June 2023.

Russia has demonstrated remarkable powers of regeneration in recent years and is likely to do so after the Syrian debarcle. That said, it does appear that Russia is packing up its presence at its key air base in Syria, the Khmeimim Air Base, and its naval vessels are loitering off the coast of Syria in what appears to be a ‘wait and see’ posture.

The Israeli’s have made the most of a bad situation in Syria. They have undertaken hundreds of strike missions to destroy elements of the Syrian air force, air defence network and the Syrian navy over the past week. These strikes have also targetted major supply depots to destroy weapons and munitions. Having observed the looting of Libyan warehouses after the fall of Giddafi, the Israelis appear to be acting to prevent the large-scale transfer of former Syrian weapons, and weapons manufacturong capacity, to terrorist organisations in the Middle East. Good.

The Israelis have also deployed their ground forces in the north of the country to seize Syrian territory on Mount Hermon. This is critical terrain and according to one analyst this week, “Israel’s radars suffered from a significant blind spot, unable to see beyond Mt. Hermon and parts of Lebanon from their position on Mt. Meron. Iran's low-flying drones exploited this weakness, infiltrating Israel time and time again.”

Image: @nhazony

The Pacific

This week saw a major Chinese exercise conducted around Taiwan without advance notice from the PLA. An obvious response to the overseas visit by the Taiwanese president, the Chinese exercise involved three different theatre commands: the Eastern, Northern, and Southern Theater Commands.

A spokesperson for the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense stated on 10 December China has deployed 90 navy and coast guard vessels around Taiwan and southern Japanese islands. Two-thirds of these vessels were PLA Navy (PLAN) warships. This comprises the largest maritime deployment since the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, and was bigger than this year’s Joint Sword-2024A and Joint Sword-2024B.

Location of Chinese naval drills near Taiwan in last week. Source: Newsweek.

The Chinese defence ministry, which was initially quiet about the activity, eventually issued the following statement:

Just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions. Whether or not to hold exercises and when to hold them is a matter for us to decide on our own according to our own needs and the situation of the struggle. Regardless of whether or not exercises are held, the People's Liberation Army will not be absent and will not be soft in its fight against independence and for reunification.

How very Sun Tzu.

The Chinese exercise was the first of this scale with no notice. It was not accompanied by the normal level of CCP propaganda associated with major PLA exercises around Taiwan. This is probably the beginning of a Chinese campaign to not only condition the West - and its neighbours - to large scale Chinese exercises but for large scale activities with no warning.

The aim of conducting these kinds of major activities without notice is to normalise them so that at some point in the future, the Chinese have the option of rapidly transitioning one of these events from an exercise to an actual military operation. This could be a blockade, or something more serious, against Taiwan.

Image: Defense News

This week, the U.S. military successfully tested an important component of the air and missile defence network it is building to defend Guam. In the test, the unique Aegis Guam System with an AN/TPY-6 radar and Vertical Launching System fired a Standard Missile-3 Block IIA interceptor, which destroyed an air-launched Medium Range Ballistic Missile target flying off the coast of Guam. The U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is spending big (US$10billion this year) to build a robust air and missile defence system for Guam. Notwithstanding this success, there is a still a long way to go in developing an effective counter to Chinese missiles that would be expected to target the island in any conflict.

Finally, way down south, the Australian Army and Royal Australian Air Force have commenced Operation Southern Discovery for the 2024-25 Austral Summer period. Key activities include cargo flights between mainland Australia and Wilkins Aerodrome; air drop operations over Antarctica; Air Force movements specialists deployed to Casey Station; Army and Air Force signallers supporting the upgrade of ICT infrastructure; and, drone operators from Navy and the Defence Science and Technology Group to support terrestrial survey at Macquarie Island.

Source: Australian Dept of Defence

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Since my last Big Five post, I published two articles here. The first examined the potential for a Russian cross river assault in southern Ukraine, or more likely, across the Oskil River in eastern Ukraine. You can read that article here.

I also published an update on the way ahead for Futura Doctrina from now and into 2025. Changes include a weekly commentary on my War Shorts podcast for paid subscribers, an annual reading list and in 2025, a regular live Q&A for paid subscribers. I am also offering from now until 26 December 2024, a discount on annual subscriptions. Whether you are upgrading from a free subscription or continuing an existing paid annunal subscription, you will be able to recieve a 20% discount. You can access the discount here.

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So, to the recommended readings…

This week, there is a interesting report on what Taiwan is learning from the war in Ukraine, and how these lessons are relevant to its defence against Chinese agression and coercion operations. There is also an excellent piece on the growing use of AI in the war in Ukraine, as well as how European nations are looking to prosecute Russian war criminals outside the established international courts.

There is also a fascinating long read about the challenges and opportunities for the intelligence community of penetrating an increasingly closed down Chinese information environment. Finally, a useful piece from the Modern War Institute on the American defence industrial base.

As always, if you only have time to read one article, the first one is my pick of the week.

Happy reading!

1. Taiwan’s Lessons from Ukraine

The Center for Naval Analyses recently released report that covered some of the lessons that Taiwan is learning from the war in Ukraine. Having visited Taiwan myself since the beginning of the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, I know that the war is being watched closely by politicians, strategists and military leaders of the small island democracy. In this report, the authors propose five key lessons. While there are many others, these provide a good start for thinking about how the lessons for Ukraine might be translated for application in the Pacific theatre. You can read the report at this link.

2. Penetrating the Fog to Analyse China

This is a fascinating article from the Studies in Intelligence journal that explores the contemporary difficulties with studying Chinese leadership, decision-making and national security affairs. But, as the author notes, “Xi’s efforts to manage perceptions of China have been impressive, but they are not impenetrable.” The article proposes several initiatives to improve the ability of the intelligence community to understand Chinese decision-making and capabilities. You can read the full 14 page article at this link.

3. AI-Enabled Drones on Ukrainian Battlefields

The explosion in the use of drones in the Ukraine War is a well known and examined phenomenon. Most recently, the Ukrainians and Russians have been including algorithms in their drones and drone operating systems to make them more secure, to harden them from EW interference, and to ensure they can complete their missions. In this article, the author examines the scaling up of AI in the war. You can read the full piece here.

4. Prosecuting Putin’s War Criminals

This is a fascinating article from the newly revamped Small Wars Journal that explores the recent case of a Russian national being tried in a Finnish court for war crimes, and how juristiction for trying warcrimes is moving beyond specialised international tribunals. As the author notes, “as national courts increasingly apply universal jurisdiction to prosecute war crimes, Russian paramilitary commanders are learning a harsh lesson: in the age of digital evidence and international justice, there are no more shadows deep enough to hide the dogs of war.” You can read the full piece here.

5. Modern Supply Chains for Deterrence and War

Finally, a good article on reinvigorating the American defence industrial sector from the Modern War Institute. The author writes that “the world has changed significantly since World War II, but the ability to achieve mass is still a foundational principle of war. While retaining the capability and capacity to field and sustain their forces to achieve national objectives, nations now face a world of weaponized interdependence. However, DoD’s existing structure does not elevate supply chains as a means of competition and warfare.” You can read the full article at this link.