The Big Five - 21 December edition

My regular update on conflict and confrontation in Ukraine, the Middle East and the Pacific, accompanied by recommended readings on modern war and future conflict.

Toretsk, Ukraine. Source: @DefenceU and the 93rd Brigade

People are dying, and he thinks it’s “interesting”... Dumbass.

President Zelenskyy on Putin, 20 December

The year is almost done, and this will be my final edition of The Big Five for 2024. I will be taking a two week break and resume these updates on 4 January 2025.

This week, I cover Ukraine, including a short strategic assessment of the current status of the war, and the Pacific Theatre. As always, I will finish with my five recommended reads on war and national security issues from the past week.

A quick note on the photo above. It shows the level of devastation that the Russian war against Ukraine has caused. Many Ukrainians are facing a cold, bleak Christmas. As we saw again this week, the Russians care nothing for the lives of the Ukrainian people and continues to target them with advanced weapons. Whether they are manning the frontlines, working in defence factories or supporting a family at home while family members serve in the armed forces, please keep the people of Ukraine in your thoughts and prayers over Christmas.

Ukraine

This week, the Ukrainian president has been on the road again, meeting with European leaders and shoring up support in advance of the inauguration of Donald Trump in January 2025. While this was occuring, the Hungarian leader proposed a new pathway to ‘peace’ to which Zelenskyy responded that “Ukraine does not need intermediaries like Orban. I will not let him in. We must interact with the US directly.”

This week, the Russian president held his annual discussion with journalists to cover a range of issues including the Russian economy and the war in Ukraine. Putin used this opportunity to propose a duel between Russia’s latest weapons and western air defence systems, with Kyiv as a target.

While we have known for sometime what a thoroughly repulsive and morally repugnant individual he is, this is yet another example of his total disregard for Ukraine and its people. Putin also indicated he was willing to meet with President Trump, an offer that will probably be accepted with delight by the incoming administration. You can read the full transcript of Putin’s “Results of the Year” here.

This week saw the first visit to Ukraine of an Australian foreign minister since the beginning of the war. During her visit, Minister Penny Wong announced a contribution to the reconstruction fund for Ukraine as well as the reopening of the Australian embassy in Kyiv (finally).

Killing Kirillov. This week, the Ukrainians killed another Russian general, this time in Moscow. On 17 December, Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov, the head of the Radiation, Chemical and Biological Protection Troops of the Russian Armed Forces, was killed by an exploding e-scooter. That will be a first for a general’s headstone.

Unfortunately, Keith Kellogg, the incoming U.S. administration’s appointed special representative for Ukraine and Russia, criticised the assassination of Russian Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov in Moscow. Kellog was quoted as saying that "when you kill flag officers, general officers, admirals or generals in their hometown, it’s like you kind of extended it [the rules of war]. And I don’t think that’s very smart to do it."

We should be clear here - targeting a senior military officer engaged in active hostilities that kills friendly soldiers is NOT against the laws of war. Generals don't get exemptions. I hope we see criticism of Russian behaviour at some point, rather than victim-blaming Ukraine. Not a great start for the ‘special representative’.

North Koreans in Combat. We had confirmation this week that not only are North Koreans being used in combat in Kursk, but are suffering significant casualties. Pentagon press secretary Major General Pat Ryder this week stated the U.S. believed North Korean soldiers were now "engaged in combat in Kursk alongside Russian forces" and that "they’re taking casualties. Based on the latest understanding that we have as of this afternoon, we’re looking at several hundred casualties, both killed and wounded".

In his evening address of 16 December, the Ukrainian president noted that “the Commander-in-Chief reported on the involvement of North Korean soldiers fighting alongside the Russian army. Preliminary data suggests that the Russians are trying to conceal the losses of the North Koreans. Unfortunately, we are forced to defend against them as well, even though there is not a single reason for North Koreans to die in this war.”

The interesting thing to watch in 2025 is whether this current contingent of 11,000 North Koreans is a one-off deployment, or is just the beginning of a constant flow of North Korean soldiers for the war.

The Frontline. First, the campaign in Kursk. This week, the Ukrainian commander-in-chief has described the Kursk campaign as something that was not discretionary for Ukraine. In an interview with French publication, which was quoted in Ukrainska Pravda, General Syrskyi described how "I had no choice; I had to conduct this operation. I needed to simultaneously disrupt the offensive on Kharkiv, reduce pressure on all fronts and prevent the opening of a new front in Sumy. That’s why I decided to advance where the enemy was vulnerable, with very few troops guarding the border."

Overall, while there has been bitter fighting in the eastern and western areas of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk, there has been minimal territory that has changed hands in the past week. The only advance of note was a Russian gain west of Malaya Loknya, in the north part of the salient.

Kursk: 12 and 20 December 2024. Source: ISW

Further south, in eastern Ukraine, Russia continues to move forward on several axes of advance. Russia has advanced southeast of Kupyansk as part of its continued push along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line. Russia also continues to have its forces advance to, and close up on, the Oskil River. They are clearly wanting to have a presence along multiple parts of the river to generate uncertainty for the Ukrainians about exactly where they intend to conduct river crossing operations. As I wrote recently, deception and surprise are critical elements in these operations.

The Russian also undertook offensive operations northeast of Siversk as well as within Chasiv Yar. They have not made any significant territorial gains in these areas. On the Toretsk axis of advance, the Russians have advanced in the northern and southern sections of Toretsk.

The Russian campaign for Pokrovsk slowly grinds forward with the Russians advancing on the town from the east, south-east and eastern directions. The most dangerous Russian advances are occuring to the south and south-east of the city, as seen in the map below. Should this continue, it may posture the Russians to undertake a ‘single envelopment’ of the city from the south and west.

Status of the Russian advance on Pokrovsk. Source: ISW

The south of Ukraine continues to see a range of Russian operations. The have advanced northwest of Vuhledar as well as in the region of the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border. The Russians have continued their attack along an axis northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka and north of Robotyne. Russian forces have given up ground however, with Ukrainian forces re-taking ground in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Finally, in what might be the initial phase of the Russians opening up another significant axis of advance in the south, an attack along the axis of the Antonivsky Bridge was repulsed by the Ukrainians. This Russian attack was most likely a probe, or a reconnaissance in force mission, which will inform the Russians about Ukrainian dispositions, C2, fires, drones and other elements that will permit the planning of subsequent Russian operations.

Of course, it might also be part of deception campaign if the Russians are planning to cross the Dnipro elsewhere. The situation in this part of the front will bear close watching in the coming weeks.

Strategic Trajectory of the War. Finally, a quick assessment of the trajectory of this war.

Russia over the past year has gained, and is exploiting, the strategic momentum. Ever since the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, Russia has sought to implement a new strategy of generating momentum on the ground, and in the minds of western decision makers, regardless of the cost. While this has translated into hundreds of thousands of casualties for the Russians, the Russians have had success in reinforcing their partnerships with China, Iran and North Korea, while also convincing some in the American polity that coercing Ukraine into a ceasefire that disadvantages Ukraine is a good thing.

Western strategic thinking on the war continues to meander and blow in the wind. Neither the U.S. nor NATO has produced an effective strategy for countering the Russian invasion. This is a key challenge Ukraine faces. While Ukraine obviously welcomes statements about support ‘for as long as it takes’ and allocations of financial, military and other forms of aid, the lack of a western strategy means that Ukraine does not really know what the west wants from the war. Does the U.S. or Europe want Ukraine to win? (Neither of the candidates for the US presidency would answer this question before the election). Does it want Russia to lose? (Biden has been clear that his objective is first and foremost to avoid WW3). This lack of a clear strategy is actually a strategy for defeat, as I have written in Foreign Affairs.

Russia has had a clear objective from the start of the war: to subjugate Ukraine. While its methods may have evolved, it has stuck with its current strategy (mobilise Russia, out wait the west, strangle Ukraine) this for almost the entirety of the war and has learned and adapted its ways to achieve this over the past three years.

Therefore, there remains a vast gulf between Russia (which knows what it wants from the war and is willing to spend the people and resources to get it) and the west (which is not really sure what it wants and is not really willing to suffer any significant financial pain – or any human pain at all – to support Ukraine).

While Ukraine has agency, and is doing all the fighting, unless the west moves from its ‘as long as it takes’ slogan to a strategy that embraces a Russian defeat in Ukraine, it is hard to see a war termination that is favourable for Ukraine. But at the same time, it is easy to see a more confident, encouraged and aggressive Russia making Europe pay for its fickleness and lack of commitment in the past three years.

As we approach the inauguration of Donald Trump and his desire to end the war in Ukraine, is worth reflecting on what happened last time Russia signed an agreement for a ceasefire in Ukraine. As Gabrielius Landsbergis writes in his recent newsletter (the full newsletter is linked below in my recommended readings):

Let’s remember how the West reacted after the first attack on Ukraine in 2014. Minsk Agreements were made that forced Ukraine to negotiate, abandon parts of its territory and legitimize the occupation without any security guarantees or additional measures that would increase readiness in case of future attacks. Putin broke the agreements immediately and continued violations until the full-scale attack in 2022. The OSCE mission that was supposed to monitor the ceasefire was thrown out of Russia, and could only document what was happening on the Ukrainian side. So in effect, as is usually the case – the victims were required to be more accountable than the aggressor.

The victims were required to be more accountable than the aggressor.

Unfortunately, history will repreat itself unless we stop believing Russian narratives and back ourselves to defend ourselves. That means a strategy for Ukraine, working actively for Russia to lose in Ukraine, and for Putin to get such a bloody nose that he won’t contemplate further aggression against his neighbours. Such a loss would also send a statement of resolve to others who are thinking about aggression against their neighbours. And, if a Russian loss means the fall of Putin, we should not be afraid of that.

2025 will be a crucial year, not just for the future of Ukraine, but for the security of Europe. It is not too late for our political leaders to set the right course to invest in a Ukrainian victory.

The Pacific

The Coming of PrSM. In the past week, the U.S. Army completed tests of two new missile systems. One was their long range hypersonic weapon. The other, which is likely to be deployed in much greater quantities, and is also going to be deployed by the Australian Army in the Pacific, is the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM). The PrSM is designed as a longer-range replacement for ATACMs, and will be able to be fired from HIMARS launchers.

A PrSM missile launched from a HIMARS vehicle. Source: Breaking Defense

The initial version of PrSM (Increment 1) will have a range of 500 kilometres. But the U.S. Army intends to develop multiple versions of PrSM. An Increment 2 missile is being developed with a multimode seeker, and will be known as the Land-Based Anti-Ship Missile (LBASM) seeker. The PrSM Increment 3 will add warheads with greater lethality. Beyond that, the U.S. Army already has contractors competing for a PrSM Increment 4 with a range of more than 1,000 kilometers, and an Increment 5 for an autonomous launcher for targets beyond 1,000 kilometers.

Incidently, the Institute for the Study of War reported that Guam police apprehended seven Chinese nationals attempting to enter the island illegally during the missile tests. The Chinese nationals arrived by boat from Saipan.

This week, the United States delivered the initial shipment of M1A2T Abrams tanks to Taiwan. The Taiwanese received 38 out of a total of 108 tanks ordered five years ago. The remainder are due to be delivered over the next year or so, which is a very slow delivery schedule.

There are some in the U.S. national security community who don’t believe Taiwan needs tanks. This is ill-informed. Last time I checked, there is a lot of land in Taiwan, and the best way to traverse land is in vehicles that lay their own road (tracks). Also, recent reports from Ukraine indicate that Ukrainians love their M1 tanks, and they have very good crew protection from drones. And, of course, nothing kills an enemy tank like a friendly tank - and China’s Marine Brigades and its PLA combined arms amphibious brigades have large amounts of armour that they intend to use in the first wave of any amphibious lodgement.

Finally this week, two developments in the south Pacific are worth noting.

First, after a large earthquake in Vanuatu, the Australian military has undertaken a deployment of aid to assist local authorities and citizens in the recovery efforts. At the same time, Australian military aircraft have been conducting evacuation of Australian citizens.

Second, this week Australia signed a security agreement with the Solomon Islands. Australia will spend $190 million on the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force to set up a new police training centre in the capital city of Honiara. While this undoubtedly will assist the people of the Solomons, it is also part of a larger effort to stop China expanding its security presence in the nation.

*****

Since my previous Big Five post, I published my 2024 reading list, which you can review, and download as a single A4 page, at this link. I also provided an update on the changes in store for Futura Doctrina over the coming months.

I also published a piece with the Lowy Institute that examined some of the lessons that Taiwan is learning from the war in Ukraine, and how those insights are changing national defence policy. You can read that article here.

I also had published a study, which was co-authoured with the awesome Clint Hinote, that examines the military operating environment out to 2030. This was part of a series of papers on military reform published by the Washington DC-based Special Competitive Studies Project. You can read our paper, and the full set of studies, at this link.

A quick reminder that paid subscribers now receive a commentary from me on my War Shorts podcast each week that covers the contents of the Big Five as well as a deep dive on a special topic. I am also offering a discount on annual subscriptions from now until 26 December 2024. Whether you are upgrading from a free subscription or continuing an existing paid annunal subscription, you will be able to recieve a 20% discount. You can access the discount here.

Finally, if you are able to, please consider donating to one of the many excellent charities and crowd funders that support the defence of Ukraine.

An important cause I support is raising funds for combat medics in Ukraine like Rebecca (Beka) Maciorowski and her team of medics in the Ukrainian 53rd Brigade. A Christmas fund raiser is ongoing to provide basic medical consumables for the combat medics of this brigade. You can see all the details on how to help at this link and follow Beka at Twitter/X and on Bluesky.

I also help the Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organisations (AFUO) wherever I can. They are a terrific organisation that unites and supports Ukrainians in Australia, whether they have lived here for generations or are new arrivals because of the war. They have several appeals which accept donations to support the people of Ukraine at this link. And you can get a feel for the kind of support they provide from this recent story about another load of medical supplies dispatched by the AFUO.

*****

So, to the recommended readings…

This week, there is a interesting report on wargaming a nuclear confrontation with China as part of a war over Taiwan, as well as a good piece on China’s learning from its observations of the war in Ukraine. There also the most recent U.S. Army assessment of its operational environment over the coming decade, and an excellent piece written by the former Lithuanian foreign minister.

I have also included a documentary in my Big Five for the first time. Regular readers will understand my great admiration for combat medics, and therefore I have included an excellent new documentary produced by the Kyiv Independent about Ukraine’s battlefield medical personnel, and how the save the lives of Ukrainian soldiers every day.

As always, if you only have time to read one article, the first one is my pick of the week.

Happy reading!

1. Peace Through Strength And That's It

My first recommended read this week (hat tip to Ben Tallis) is from Gabrielius Landsbergis, who served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania from December 2020 until November 2024. In this newsletter, he reflects on how we have arrived at this current moment, and what can be done to redress Russian aggression against Ukraine and the rest of Europe. As he notes, “we have to be the ones rejecting Putins' reality, pushing back against it, never allowing complacency to set in.” You can read the full newsletter here.

2. Wargaming Nuclear Deterrence

Recently, a team from the Center for Strategic and International Studies conducted a wargame to explore the nuclear dynamics in a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Key issues included the sources of the greatest pressure for using nuclear weapons, and what would happen if nuclear weapons were used. The authors found that “the greatest pressure for nuclear use came when China teams reached a crisis: their invasion
of Taiwan was in danger of a defeat that might threaten Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule.” You can read the full study here.

3. China’s Learning from Ukraine

China has actively studied foreign war, since the Falkands conflict in the early 1980s, the glean insights on modern war and to understand how western military institutions think and fight. Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, it has done the same and has analysed lessons for its own use, from drones to artillery, from leadership to strategy. In this piece, Peter Singer explores just a few of the lessons the Chinese are drawing from the war in Ukraine. You can read the article at this link.

4. Land Operations in the Coming Decade

The U.S. Army has recently published its updated assessment of the operating environment for the period between now and 2034. These assessments are important becuase they guide procurement of new systems, divestment in obsolete weapons and guide training and education across the institution. The latest report describes 12 key conditions that will have the greatest influence on land operations over the next decade, and these are explored in detail in the report. The report is available at this link.

5. Ukraine’s Combat Medics

I know this isn’t a book, report or article, but it is an important documentary from the team at the Kyiv Independent on Ukrainian combat medics. Called "Can You Hear Me? The Invisible Battles of Ukrainian Military Medics," it is an exploration of Ukrainian military medics in the Ukrainian armed forces from the frontlines to their health retreats in Sweden. You can watch this superb documentary here.