The Big Five - 30 November edition

My regular update on conflict and confrontation in Ukraine, the Middle East and the Pacific, accompanied by recommended readings on modern war and future conflict.

Image: 53rd Mechanized Brigade and Beka Maciorowski

Well, what a week! Ceasefires, threats of new missiles to be used against Kyiv, more PLA senior officer sackings and a rebel advance into Alleppo in Syria.

This week, I will be covering a broad swathe of conflicts, starting with Ukraine, then traveling into the Middle East and across the world to the Pacific Theatre. And, as always, I will finish with my five recommended reads on war and national security issues from the past week.

Ukraine

This week, President Zelenskyy put forward a proposal to end the "hot phase of the war," NATO should offer membership to Ukrainian territory currently under government control. Such an invitation should recognize Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders. As he noted in an interview with Sky News, “if we want to stop the hot stage of the war, we should quickly take under NATO umbrella the territory of Ukraine that we have under our control. That's what we need to do first, and then Ukraine can get back the other parts of its territory in a diplomatic way.”

Russian president Putin during the past week put the nuclear saber back in its scabbard and instead used the Oreshnik missile to threaten Ukraine. Speaking in Astana, Putin declared that Russia was drawing up lists of decision-making centres in Kyiv for attack by the new missiles. However, at the almost three year mark of the war, one wonders why it has taken the Russian so long to decide to do this. Finally from Putin this week, he announced during a news conference while in Kazakhstan that Russia “would not allow Ukraine to develop nuclear weapons.”

The incoming Trump administration this week announced their intention to appoint retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg as his special envoy for Ukraine (and Russia). Kellogg, who co-authored a recent plan (published here) on how to coerce Ukraine and Russia into ending the war, was the chief of staff of the National Security Council from 2017 to 2018 and national security advisor to Vice President from 2018 to 2021.

Given the anti-Ukraine stance of some in Trump’s inner circle, the appointment of Kellogg is probably a ‘least bad’ outcome for Ukraine. There have been some useful analyses of Kellogg’s appointment in recent days. I recommend reading that by Stefan Korshak, a veteran Ukraine observer and reporter, that was published here in the Kyiv Post. At the conclusion of his assessment, Korshak makes a final, and important, caveat about Kellogg’s appointment:

Both Moscow and Kyiv will, in upcoming negotiations be aware that veteran national security experts that, like Kellogg, worked for Trump during his first term as US President from 2016-2000, were often sidelined or simply sacked if they were seen to directly disagree with him.

Until Trump himself speaks and makes decisions on this issue from 20 January 2025, there will remain a great deal of uncertainty for the governments in Kyiv, Moscow and across Europe.

Drone operators working from a bunker - the face of modern war. Image: @DefenceU

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy replaced the commander of the Ground Forces of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, Oleksandr Pavliuk, with Mykhailo Drapatyi. The decision was announced after a meeting of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Staff on 29 November. Zelenskyy also announced the appointment of Colonel Oleh Apostol as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Ukraine this week came under sustained Russian aerial bombardment. Back on 17 November, Russia launched a massive missile and drone strike against Ukraine, targeting energy infrastructure, residential areas and railways. This attack involved 120 missiles of various types and 90 combat drones. This week the Russians have stepped up their attacks even more.

The biggest attack this week saw the Russians on 28 November target energy infrastructure across the country. Over 180 drones and missiles were launched against Ukraine. These hit a dozen sites of fuel and energy infrastructure, and acording to Ukraine’s Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko, the Russian attack struck a "massive blow" at Ukraine's power grid. This included hitting three key substations that are vital to the electricity distribution from nuclear power plants. Over one million Ukrainian households were plunged into darkness due to the resulting power cuts.

The Russian state media this week reported that the Russian Southern Military District (SMD) and Southern Grouping of Forces commander Colonel General Gennady Anashkin had been replaced with Eastern Military District (EMD) acting commander Lieutenant General Alexander Sanchik. Apparently this was just a routine rotation of commanders.

In eastern Ukraine, Russia is sustaining its bloody advance on several fronts. While Russia is taking record numbers of casualties, Ukrainian manpower shortages are having an impact on the ability to the Ukrainian ground forces to hold ground in the east. The Russians have advanced into central Toretsk and gained ground across eastern Ukraine. You can see the extend of these gains in the images below.

Russian gains in eastern Ukraine. Source: ISW

In Kursk, the Russians continue to place pressure on the defending Ukrainian forces in the salient. Russian attacks in the northern and eastern portions of the salient have pushed the Ukrainians back further in the past week.

In southern Ukraine, Ukrainian intelligence believes that Russia is preparing for an advance on Zaporizhia city. This city, which is currently 30km from the frontline, is an important centre of industry. And, it is the capital of an oblast which Putin in 2022 illegally claimed for Russia. For months now, the Russians have subjected the city to aerial attack, using glide bombs and missiles.

The timing of any Russian advance on the city remains unknown. Given the casualties the Russians have been sustaining recently, their ability to mount a third major ground campaign, concurrent with their Kursk and eastern Ukraine offensives, must be questioned.

This week, the Ukrainian general staff released figures that indicate that the Russians for the first time suffered more than 2000 casualties in a single day. For most of this war, we have consistently over estimated the impact of large casualties on the Russian capacity to generate forces and conduct operations. We should take care to not exaggerate the likely impact of these new figures on the Russian capacity to continue taking ground and imposing casualties on the Ukrainians. Both Russia and Ukraine are hurting from their current levels of casualties but unfortunately these losses are most sustainable (but not indefinitely) for the Russians.

Finally, it was reported this week that the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, General Syrskyi has announced plans for a future counteroffensive. Syrskyi described the necessity of offensive operations as part of any Ukrainian victory. “Victory is impossible if the Armed Forces of Ukraine only play defense. We need to seize the initiative and counterattack. We must, and we will. Where and when—stay tuned.”

The rationale for announcing such an offensive is partially about improving the morale of Ukrainians, and sustaining support from western aid providers. By speaking about offensives, Syrskyi is probably also to place doubt into the minds of Russian commanders and any intentions they may have for opening up a ‘third front’ in the south.

But given the challenges that Ukraine is already facing with regards to manpower in its defensive operations in the east and south of Ukraine, it is difficult to see how Ukraine might mount another large scale offensive in the short term. And, winter is hardly conducive to such operations. However, the Ukrainians have surprised us on multiple occasions in the past…

The Middle East

Two big stories this week in the Middle East: the Lebanon ceasefire and the Syrian rebel’s advance into Aleppo.

First, this week a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hezbollah was brokered by the United States and France. The ceasefire is designed to "promote conditions for a permanent and comprehensive situation." The agreement has 13 points, one of which is how the disengagement of forces will occur:

Upon the commencement of the cessation of hostilities according to paragraph one, Israel will withdraw its forces in a phased manner south of the Blue Line, and in parallel the LAF will deploy to positions in the Southern Litani Area shown in the attached LAF Deployment Plan, and will commence the implementation of its obligations under the commitments, including the dismantling of unauthorised sites and infrastructure and confiscating unauthorised arms and related materiel.

You can read the full text of the 13 point agreement here. So far, the agreement appears to be holding although both sides have accused the other of violating it in the past few days.

The Council on Foreign Relations posted an interesting piece on the lessons from 2006 that might inform the enforcement of this current Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement. You can read it here.

Interestingly, this week the Israelis also posted images of their forces on the banks of the Litani River. This is a key geographic feature, about 29 kilometres north of Israel, because under the terms of UN Resolution 1701, Hezbollah (and other forces) were supposed to have withdrawn north of this river after 2006. The UN was supposed to have monitored and enforced this.

As we know, and as the Israelis have been reporting on for years, neither of these things happened. Hezbollah kept much of its force generation and higher command and control to the north of the river. But is also maintained large offensive forces (the Radwan force and its supporting UAV and indirect fires) as well as tens of thousands of launch tubes for various rockets south of the Litani. This is what the IDF has been busy destroying over the last couple of months.

I recently had the opportunity to visit this northern Israel border area, and receive a comprehensive brief from the Commander of the IDF’s Northern Command, Major General Ori Gordin. You can read my report on that visit here. Also, below, is an image of Major General Gordin this week standing on the banks of the Litani.

Major General Gordin on the banks of the Litani River this week.

The other major development in the Middle East this week has been the advances made by rebel forces in Syria. In the past 24 hours it has been reported that the rebels have now fought their way into central Aleppo. The rebels have also advanced to the town of Saraqab, in north-western Syria, which is on a route that would provide secure lines of supply to Aleppo.

Aleppo is Syria’s second biggest city, and was recaptured from the rebels by Syrian government forces in 2016, with aid from Russia, Iran and Hezbollah. Now, with Russia focussed on Ukraine, Iran on the back foot and Hezbollah suffering from a shellacking from the IDF over the last few months, it is unlikely the Syrian Assad regime can expect large amounts of external aid. It will be interesting to watch the next moves of Assad and the rebels in the coming days and weeks.

The Pacific

This week saw a joint Russia-China bomber patrol between the Korean Peninsula and Japan. The bombers, China H-6 aircraft and Russian Tu-95s, were intercepted by the Japanese Air Self Defence Force. This is the ninth joint strategic air patrol since 2019. Given the U.S. has in the past week been flying B-52 bombers in proximity to Russia’s border with Finland, this China-Russia joint patrol may in part be a response to that. But it is also evidence of the two military organisations’ ability to collaborate, which is not a positive development for nations in the Pacific.

Images: Japanese Self Defence Force

The South Korean military also confirmed late this week that six Russian and five Chinese military aircraft entered the country's air defense identification zone (ADIZ), which saw the RoK Air Force scramble fighter jets in response.

What is it with senior Chinese military leaders? This week we saw two senior officials placed under investigation.

First, the Chinese defence minister Dong Jun was placed under investigation for corruption. While there has been a denial from the Chinese government that this is the case, as of posting this, his fate remains unclear. He is the third consecutive Chinese defense minister to face corruption allegations. That must be a record of sorts?

Next, according to CCTV, Miao Hua, a member of Central Military Commission (CMC) and director of CMC's Political Work Department, was suspended from his appointment apparently because of suspected serious violations of discipline. China expert Joel Wuthnow notes that “Miao Hua’s fall is a big deal because he was the ultimate insider - going back to his days in the 31st GA in Fujian, same time as Xi.”

There are lots of reasons why this might be happening, and happening now. Perhaps there are centres of power growing in the PLA that Xi is uncomfortable with. Perhaps they have not been moving PLA modernisation along fast enough. Perhaps they had a relationship with the wrong person. Or maybe their corruption, which is not unusual in the Chinese military was too much for even Xi to ignore.

This week also saw a couple of announcements about the force posture of the United States in the western Pacific. First, was the announcement of the first Virginia class submarine being based in Guam. The USS Minnesota (SSN-783) arrived in Guam this week. As reported by the U.S. Naval Institute, the new submarine joins “four older Los Angeles-class nuclear fast attack boats — USS Asheville (SSN-758), USS Jefferson City (SSN-759), USS Annapolis (SSN-760) and USS Springfield (SSN-761) — in Submarine Squadron 15 at Naval Base Guam. Guam is also the home port of the Navy’s only submarine tenders, USS Emory S. Land (AS-39) and USS Frank Cable (AS-40).”

USS Minnesota arrives in Guam this week. Source: USNI

The other U.S. force posture development was a report in the Japanese media that there will be a deployment of a U.S. Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) equipped with the Himars rocket launcher system to the Nansei Islands. These islands, as you can see on the map below, are close to Taiwan.

This activity will provide excellent training for the personnel of the MLR, and will collect data to aid in the deployment of forces to these islands, launch points, deception and camouflage as well as rehearsing connecting into the Japanese military targeting and strike system. Being able to have a forward deployed element of a U.S.-Japan kill chain so close to Taiwan is a good deterrent capability and a useful warfighting element if China decides to conduct a military blockade or attack against Taiwan.

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Since my last Big Five post here, I published an article here that provided some strategic reflections based on my visit to Israel earlier this month. You can read that article here. Just a reminder that last week I also published a piece at Engelsberg Ideas about the 40th anniversary of the publication of The Hunt for Red October, and the enduring popularity (and importance) of military fiction.

Last week, my book The War for Ukraine: Strategy and Adaptation Under Fire was released on audiobook. I know there are many of you who like this format, and I hope you enjoy the book this way. You can check it out here.

This week I attended a couple of seminars where I presented. One was an army event which wasn’t public, and the other was a public event in Sydney. Business NSW held their first drone summit in downtown Sydney, which provided a platform for innovative Australian companies to demonstrate and discuss many elements of drone design, manufacturing and employment. I gave a presentation on the strategic insights from the war in Ukraine, and what these might mean for the Pacific region. Of note, Australian-Ukrainian researcher Oleksandra Malloy gave an excellent presentation based on her recent report about drone lessons from Ukraine (you can read that report here).

Me presenting to the drone summit in Sydney this week.

*****

So, to the recommended readings…

This week, a mix of articles including an assessment of the appointment of Keith Kellogg as the special envoy for Ukraine and Russia in the forthcoming Trump administration, the path way ahead for the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, and the potential role for the OSCE in any Ukraine peace deal. There is also a good article on assessing military innovation and a piece from Joint Forces Quarterly about the potential for a U.S. blockade of China in any future war.

As always, if you only have time to read one article, the first one is my pick of the week.

Happy reading!

1. Blockades and Confrontation with China

This article explores the potential effectiveness of a U.S.-led maritime blockade in any prolonged war with China. This piece employs historical examples, and examines how China’s reliance on maritime imports and exports makes it vulnerable to a destabilization of its economy in order to pressure the Chinese Communist Party. Finally, the article examines how China’s breadth of military capabilities, regional economic linkages and growing global diplomatic power would challenge the use of a blockade strategy. You can read the article, published by Joint Forces Quarterly, here.

2. North Korea’s Nuclear Pre-emption Doctrine

This recent commentary from Japan’s National Institute of Defence Studies (NIDS) explores North Korea’s nuclear posture. As the author writes, “North Korea’s nuclear preemption is the doctrine that it is possible to start a war with nuclear weapons. This presents an even more threatening stance than Russia’s first use, the policy of escalating to nuclear weapons before the enemy country at a time of war.” You can read the full analysis on this subject at this link.

3. Ukrainian Peace and the OSCE

In this article for the Royal United Services Institute, the author explores the potential role of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in post-war stabilization of Ukraine. But at the author notes, there are pitfalls in this approach were he writes that “the OSCE’s relevance was recognised in the 2014–15 Minsk Agreements, which envisaged it taking on a significant role in monitoring and verifying a ceasefire and border zones. That said, the failure of those agreements and collapse of the earlier OSCE Special Monitoring Mission are a reminder of the risks involved.” You can read the article here.

4. Analysis of the Kellogg Plan for Ukraine

One of my favourite Ukraine-based journalists is Stefan Korshak. Stefan has spent years in Ukraine and in Eastern Europe, and also has a tremendous knowledge of the Ukrainian military. In this piece, Stefan conducts an analysis of the Kellogg plan for Ukraine that was published earlier in 2024, and what the prospects are for negotiations with Russian once Donald Trump returns to the White House in 2025. You can read the full article here.

5. Assessing Bottom-Up Military Innovation

This report from the Australian Army Research Centre reports on the findings from a study of bottom-up innovation in multiple military institutions, including the Australian Defence Force (ADF), New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), United States Armed Forces (US military), and British Armed Forces (BAF). The NZDF, US military and BAF are benchmarked against the ADF to explore best practice in bottom-up innovation and find areas where bottom-up innovation can be approved. You can read the report here.