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Excellent. While I completely agree with your “four variables” I would add a fifth, which could have a significant impact as early as 2024. Kim Jung En is craftily using his leverage to pry nuclear and missiles technologies out of Russia that North Korea is having difficulty developing. Nuclear propulsion technology and missile warhead technology are two areas he has been asking for. However, the fifth variable is probably the sticking point in all these negotiations - money. Russia’s income from its only real exports - oil and gas - has dropped like a rock and its “alternate” customers (China and India) are paying in their local currencies - not dollars. Russia is running through its sovereign wealth fund like water even using their (very questionable) figures. How long can this continue? Cuba, Venezuela, North Korea and Iran have proven resilient outside the global economy. Can Russia? It remains to be seen. While Russia may be able to trade its technology and “high tech” weapons to North Korea and Iran for shells and drones, will that be enough? Putin is afraid of his population. Defeat on the battlefield, further mobilization and a deteriorating economy are going to make his life very difficult.

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Mick, another great piece on strategies and preparation going forward. It takes great humility to recognize that as much as we can observe and know from our experience predicting the future direction of a war is folly for all the reasons you stated. What is role of surprise and contingency planning going forward and what does that look like? Though never a fan of Rumsfeld, his characterization of “known unknowns and unknown unknowns” does ring true. What are the possible “known unknowns” around which contingency planning can be done? How can Ukraine or Russia prepare for realizations of events that were not foreseen as possible? On this last point I would think Ukraine is better equipped with more decentralized and flexible decision making than Russia.

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