The Big Five - 25 January edition
My regular update on global conflict & confrontation. This week: Trump's peace overtures, Russia murders more PoWs, Ukraine strikes Russia again, N Korea's new troops & China's invasion barges.
Welcome to the 25 January 2025 edition of The Big Five.
This week, as the Trump administration clears its throat and begins to talk more seriously about how it might ‘end the war’ in Ukraine, I cover the normal range of conflicts, starting with Ukraine and then across the world to the Pacific Theatre. As always, I will finish with my five recommended reads on war and national security issues from the past week.
In my weekly commentary, just published here, I explore these issues and conduct a special deep dive on the implications of next generation robotic warfare. This extends on the story I published on this topic during the week, and explores case studies of what the next gen robotic warfare era might look like in the very near future.
Ukraine
The main focus of the update this week is the new efforts to ‘end the war’ that are beginning to take shape in the thinking of the Trump administration.
Presidential Peacemaking. There have been several statements from the new (and returning) President of the United States of America related to the war in Ukraine since his inauguration this past Monday.
On 22 January, President Trump called on Russia to "make a deal" to end the war. Further, he warned Putin that if they failed to reach an agreement that this would inevitably lead to increased sanctions and tariffs on Russian exports. As Trump described it on his social media platform, “if a deal is not reached, I will have no other choice but to put high levels of taxes, tariffs, and sanctions on anything being sold by Russia to the United States and other participating countries…We can do it the easy way or the hard way. The easy way is always better."
On 23 January, Trump addressed the World Economic Forum being held in Davos. In his videolink speech, Trump stated how “I’m also going to ask Saudi Arabia and OPEC to bring down the cost of oil. You got to bring it down, which, frankly, I’m surprised they didn’t do before the election…If the price came down, the Russia-Ukraine war would end immediately. Right now, the price is high enough that that war will continue. You got to bring down the oil price; you’re going to end that war.”
Later in the same speech, Trump notes that “I’m also going to ask all NATO nations to increase defense spending to 5 percent of GDP, which is what it should have been years ago — it was only at 2 percent, and most nations didn’t pay until I came along.”
And in the Q&A session at Davos, Trump was asked about the prospects for peace. His response: “Well, you’re going to have to ask Russia. Ukraine is ready to — to make a deal.” Clearly Trump is seeing Russia as the key obstacle to peace at this point.
Two other subjects from the Davos Q&A stood out.
First, Trump discussed Chinese assistance with ending the war in Ukraine. He stated that “hopefully, China can help us stop the war with, in particular, Russia-Ukraine. And they have a great deal of power over that situation, and we’ll work with them.” The Chinese responded with a statement from their Foreign Ministry which I cover in the Pacific section below. It is likely that the Chinese will, on the surface, appear to help with peace. Underneath however, it is in China’s strategic interest to have Europe and America focussed on Russia and for a slow, long-term degradation of Russian power to take place. I am not sure how much real help Xi will provide.
The second interesting topic was Trump’s mention of denuclearisation. While a noble goal, this is almost inconcievable given how important nuclear weapons have been to Putin’s ability to manipulate U.S. decision making in the past three years, and the lessons that Xi will have learned from this.
One of the best analyses of the events of this week with regards to the war in Ukraine is the latest essay from Sir Lawrence Freedman. Writing in his Comment is Freed substack (which I highly recommend), he notes that:
To outsiders a ceasefire always appears preferable to continuing violence, especially with a war that has been going on for so long without reaching a definitive conclusion. But the fighting persists because the stakes are very high for both sides and there is no obvious compromise position. As Russia started the war and Ukraine is fighting for its existence, the war is only going to end when Moscow recognises that it cannot win and must cut its losses. That remains the prior condition for successful negotiations.
This is an important assessment to keep in mind. Peace at any price is not really peace; it is unjust, and is only delaying another fight over the underlying issues somewhere down the track. As Freedman notes, the stakes on both sides are very high. For Ukraine, their existence is at stake. For Russia, their existence is not at threat but Putin’s probably is. So an easy and early solution to the war is unlikely.
But, in the past 24 hours, Putin has stated that he is ready to talk. In an interview with Russian domestic TV, he stated that:
It would be better for us to meet, based on the realities of today, to talk calmly on all those areas that are of interest to both the United States and Russia…We are ready. But, I repeat, this primarily, of course, depends on the decisions and choices of the current American administration.
Being ready to talk, and being ready to negotiate and compromise are two different things. And, given Putin is imagining a Trump-Putin summit that excludes the Ukrainians, there is probably some way to go before an agreement on negotiations can be achieved.
Trump has clearly recognised this week that this is unlikely to be a war which can be resolved quickly. That is a good thing because it means that he and his administration will be able to provide more feasible contributions to helping to negotiate a ceasefire and to address the underlying issues of the war.
He probably has a window of opportunity in the coming months to have a major impact on the trajectory of the war in Ukraine, as different governments still learn about how he will govern, and how he will use American military, economic and diplomative power to influence international affairs. It may well be a ‘one off’ opportunity. As David Ignatius noted in a column ithis week, Trump’s “global agenda has many positives. For good or ill, Trump will never be stronger than he is now, with the world in stunned submission, and I hope he puts his best diplomatic initiatives on a fast track.”
Russian Executions of Ukrainian PoWs Continues. The Prosecutor General's Office in Ukraine this week opened yet another criminal case against Russia for war crimes after a video emerged that shows Russian soldiers executing six unarmed Ukrainian prisoners of war. The events shown in the video, which include the Russian soldiers discussing who should shoot each prisoner of war, apparently occured in the Donetsk region.
The number of executions of unarmed Ukrainian POWs immediately after their capture has increased significantly in the past year. The Ukrainian authorities have recorded in excess of 180 executions of Ukrainian POWs by the Russians since February 2022. Given how much ambiguity there often is in combat operations, there almost certain to have been many more than this number.
While the invesitgation and prosecution of the Russians responsible is handled by the Ukrainian Prosecutor General, the Ukrainian ground forces are also acting to bring the perpetrators of these war crimes to justice. Last week it was reported that Ukrainian special forces conducted a raid on a Russian unit that was responsible for the murder of two Ukrainian Territorial Defence Force soldiers. The raid result in three Russians killed and several captured.
The prevalence of these crimes in the Russian army indicates that their soldiers are either ordered or incentivised to shoot PoWs by their commanders, or that Russian commanders willingly look away from such events. Either way, it has been systematised now in the Russian system. And the fact that Russian soldiers video these crimes and post them online means they don’t fear any form of retribution from their own commanders. As such, not only are the individuals who commit the crimes responsible but so is their entire chain of command that has ignored these events. There is simply no way now that any Russian officer can claim in the future that ‘I didn’t know this was occuring’.
For those interested in more details about the magnitude of Russian war crimes committed since February 2022, this report from the Congresssional Research Service provides a good overview.
Ukrainian Resistance. In 2021, the Ukrainian president signed a law that provides the foundations of a national resistance model. The law, called the “Law on the Fundamentals of National Resistance” provided iniatives to develop territorial defence and resistance movements, and introduced a national resilience system for the people of Ukraine.
Since the beginning of the war, Ukrainians have undertaken violent and non-violent operations to assist Ukrainian military strikes and resist the brutal and repressive Russian occupation. The conduct of this resistance has been studied by western military organisations and think tanks over that time. Some interesting article on this topic can be found here, here, and here.
Last June, Dr Jade McGlynn published an excellent report on this topic. Called Crossing Thresholds, the report provided insights into the purpose of resistance, its impact on Russia’s war and occupation activities and the reality of conducting resistance. Now, Dr McGlynn will compile a regular report on this subject on the excellent Ukraine: The Latest podcast. You can listen to the first episode here.
The Economic War. Both Ukraine and Russia continued their strike operations this week.
On the evening of 24 January 24, drones operated by Ukrainian special forces struck facilities in Russia. Targets hit include the Ryazan Oil Refining Company, the Ryazan oil pumping station, and the the Kremniy El microelectronics plant in Bryansk which produces components for Russian air defence systems like the Topol-M, S-300 and S-400 systems.
The Ryazan refinery is about 500 kilometers from the Ukraine border. Again, this demonstrates the increasing capacity and sophistocation of Ukraine’s long range strike complex. Ukraine also struck defense industrial companies and oil refineries in Russia on the night of January 20 to 21. Ukrainian Special Operation Forces conducted a drone strike against Rosneft's Lisinskaya Oil Refinery in Voronezh Oblast
Given that this long-range strike ability was almost a non-existant capability for Ukraine in February 2022, the degree of development and adaptation of strike systems since that time is something that provides lessons for the rest of us. And, as I wrote in a recent assessment on this topic:
The strategic strike complexes of both nations now exist in a tenuous parity. Both Ukraine and Russia have the capacity to strike key targets at long range, and to do so consistently and in mass attacks.
Ukraine also reportedly hit an aircraft manufacturing plant in Kazan on January 20 as a part of it campaign to degrade Russian military capacity.
Russia has continued its attacks against Ukrainian energy infrastructure and civilian targets. A major Russian strike this week occured in Zaporizhzhia. 52 people were wounded and at least one killed. A second Russian strike occurred after rescue operations has commenced. At least three people were killed in another Russian strike on a residential building in Kyiv. The stats below show the number of Russian strikes, and drones shot down, this week.
The Ground War. There is not a lot of good news for Ukraine on the ground this week.
In Kursk, the Russians have gained additional ground although these gains have been small and at significant cost. It is likely that Kursk will be the location for the deployment of additional North Korean troops in the near future (see more on this below).
Russian forces conducted attacks on the Kharkiv, Kupyansk, Lyman, Borova, and Siversk axes of advance during the week. They recently advanced on the Chasiv Yar axis of advance, mainly south of Chasiv Yar. Russian forces advanced on the Toretsk axis of advance, and on their main effort, the envelopment of Pokrovsk.
Russian forces recently advanced within Velyka Novosilka and appear to now control much of the city. Finally, in the south, the Russians conducted attacks north of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka and Novodanylivka as well as limited attacks on the islands of the Dnipro River Delta.
Finally, it appears that the North Korean deployment to Ukraine is not a ‘one and day’ expedition. This week, the head of Ukrainian intelligence General Budanov spoke publicly about North Korea sending additional troops to Russia to support their war against Ukraine. This subsequent deployment appears to be artillery units, including long range missiles and artillery systems such as their self-propelled 170mm howitzers.
This is likely to have some impact on the war on the ground. And, as I wrote earlier this week, it will also provide the North Koreans with insights into modern coordination of fires, and speeding up tactical and operational kill chains. This will not please South Korea or the U.S. who must plan for a future war against the North Koreans.
The Pacific
China this week stated that is willing to play a constructive role in achieving a resolution to the war in Ukraine. Speaking on 24 January, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated that "China will continue to promote peace talks and stands ready to maintain communication with other parties…Dialogue and negotiation is the only viable way to resolve the Ukraine crisis. We are happy to see that all parties play a constructive role and build conditions for deescalation and the political settlement of the crisis."
A follow up analysis of the Chinese barges that were reported a couple of weeks ago appeared during the week. Tom Shugart posted a long thread that employed new imagery that shows up to seven of the barges in various stages of construction and testing in China. Additionally, it appears now that there are at least two different designs that are being produced.
For more, watch the Covert Shores video at this link and read H.I. Sutton’s reports here.
The Taiwanese legislature passed significant cuts and freezes to the 2025 national budget. The budget reductions by the KMT-led legislature will impact the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration's ability to function. The Ministry of National Defence (MND) gets a freeze of 30% of its operating budget, the submarine construction program sees 50% of its funding frozen, and there is a 3% cut to its military equipment budget. These cuts are likely to have an impact on training and readiness. More importantly, it sends a bad message to countries like the U.S. who are assisting Ukraine.
Taiwan’s Ministry of Digital Affairs (MODA) this week announced that Taiwan’s two undersea internet cables between Taiwan and its Matsu Islands were disconnected within one week. This does not appear to be a Chinese action but was instead due to natural deterioration. It does however highlight, again, the vulnerability of these important 21st century information conduits.
Exercise La Perouse 25, a French-led multilateral maritime training activity in the Indian Ocean, was conducted this week in waters south of Indonesia. During the exercise, 12 ships and over 30 aircraft exercised maritime interoperability missions, boarding operations, live fire, and air-based search and rescue. La Perouse 25 included navies from Australia, Canada, France, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and United States, and included the French Navy aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle.
Finally, for all those Aussies out there - at home in Oz and abroad - happy Australia Day for 26 January!
*****
I published several articles in the past week. Most recently, my assessment of the key military trends for 2025 was published by the Lowy Institute, where I am the Senior Fellow for Military Studies. You can read that piece, for free, at this link.
I also had a chapter in a new book published this week. The book, Professionals Talk Logistics, was edited by Steve ‘Doctrine Man’ Leonard and Jon Klug. It explores the various dimensions of military logistics in the 21st century, and includes chapters from a range of experts in the field. My chapter, Darwin Strategic Bastion, is a fictional deep dive into the strategic bastion concept that I wrote about in White Sun War. Congratulations to Steve and Jon for bringing this project to publication and thank you to the team at Howgate for publishing the book.
The subject of autonomy and autonomous systems was the focus of another article this week. I examined what I described as Next Gen Robotic War in the context of recent Ukrainian attacks that used maritime drones to launch other drones, and the use of an entirely robotic force in the Battle of Lyptsi. I also launched my new section here on books, which I will publish articles on regularly.
Finally, this week I finished the manuscript for my next book. While I don’t want to let the cat out of the bag too early, I will say that it is a work of military fiction. Expect more on this in due course. But for now, please be assured that I have not been resting on my laurels since The War for Ukraine was published in August last year!
*****
So, to my recommended readings…
This week, there is a interesting piece on negotiating the end of the war in Ukraine by Sir Lawrence Freedman. I have also included a new piece by Frank Hoffman that examines risk in U.S. strategic affairs.
There are also articles on improving recruiting in Ukraine, the potential for an Iranian dash to nuclear weapons capability and another entry in the great ‘offence v defence’ debate.
As always, if you only have time to read one article, the first one is my pick of the week.
Happy reading!
1. Stop Mocking the Gods: Risk and Strategic Planning
The latest edition of the Joint Forces Quarterly has some excellent articles. Perhaps the best, in my humble opinion, is this piece from Frank Hoffman who explores the concept of risk in U.S. strategic planning and decision-making. As he states in the article, “risk is not well understood, and risk management is not applied consistently and explicitly at the policy and strategic decisionmaking levels.” This is a long read but a very good one, and you read the full piece at this link.
2. The Beginning of the End
I referred to this outstanding essay from Sir Lawrence Freedman in my Ukraine update above. The essay covers the most recent developments in America, Ukraine and Russia with regards to potential peace negotiations, and what the prospects are for reconsiling Ukrainian and Russian strategic objectives during those negotiations. You can read the full piece at this link.
3. Reforming Recruiting in Ukraine
This week, a story was published by the Associated Press that looked at Ukrainian efforts to reform their military recruiting programs. In particular, the Ukrainian plan aims to attract those 18- to 25-year-olds who are currently exempt from mobilisation. One initiative is called an “honest contract.” Military recruiting and conscription is a challenge that will need to be addressed by Ukraine this year. Read about this one potential solution here.
4. Defence v Offence
This week, the newest edition of Military Strategy Magazine was released. This is one of my favourite journals and the latest edition does not disappoint. One great article in the latest edition examines the relative strengths and weaknesses of defensive and offensive operations. Further, the author conducts this examination against the context of the war in Ukraine. While I think that whether defence v offensive is strongest is something that will continue to fluctuate, as it has throughout history, this is a great entry in the defence v offence debate. You can read the full piece here.
5. A Rapid Iranian Nuke?
This week, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists published an analysis of the current state of the Iranian nuclear program and how quickly they might be able to construct and deploy a nuclear weapon. As the article notes, “there is no public evidence that Iran has made up its mind to build a bomb. But the recent weakening of its conventional deterrence against Israel’s attacks on its territory as well as on its allies may motivate Tehran to pursue a nuclear deterrent…Should Iran decide to go nuclear, even as it faces the risk of Israeli or US strikes on its nuclear facilities, it will be able to make its first bombs quickly and secretly.” The full article is available here.
Thanks for the introduction to the Feedman's SubStack.
Thank you. I am more and more concerned about the likelihood of a larger war in the next ~5 years, at this rate. Both in Europe and in Asia. And yes, Europe seems to still sleep.