The Defence of Taiwan
The Impact of a Meshed Civil-Military Information Environment
Social media has revolutionised global communication, social interaction, marketing and professional discourse. It has demonstrated a capacity for penetration and influencing perceptions of humans that is historically unprecedented, particularly when compared to other means of communication. Social media is also more viral; users are more likely to share content in their social networks. As Peter Singer and Emerson Brooking have written, “You are now what you share.”
It is highly democratised, and available to the vast majority of humans. In 2023, around 4.9 billion people are classified as social media users. Although there are limitations placed on content in many countries – China has a state-of-the-art censorship regime – even authoritarian nations like Russia and China have their own versions of social media which are often used as tools of influence by the state and corporations.
But, as we have seen throughout the war in Ukraine, the ‘influence playing field’ is not entirely controlled by authoritarian regimes like Russia or China. Before the 24 February invasion of Ukraine, as well as during the first 500 days of the war, intelligence services from the United States and other nations have employed sensitive sources and reporting to attempt to pre-empt Russian operations. These releases of information have discredited Russian narratives about the war, crowded the information space to degrade the impact of Russian influence campaigns, and sought to pre-empt the Russian use of weapons of mass destruction.
President Zelensky, and other members of his government, have also mastered the leveraging of various social media to ensure Ukraine receives military, economic, intelligence, political and humanitarian aid from the West. Ukraine has executed a large-scale strategic influence program to shape the view of western governments and citizens in addition to gaining military and diplomatic assistance. This has been complemented by the efforts of citizen journalists, hacktivists and other private individuals at home and abroad to transmit images, maps and commentary on the war.
The rise of citizen social media war commentators was noted in a 2013 paper titled The New War Correspondents. But there has been an explosion in this approach during the Russo-Ukraine War. Hundreds, if not thousands, of online commentators – some well credentialed and experienced, some not experienced at all – have gained a high level of influence among populations in Russia, Ukraine and in many western nations. Analysts have developed sophisticated mapping products to track progress in the war and have shared countless numbers of images and videos which all exert some level of influence on those who view them.
Social Media Targeting in Ukraine
This has been a role traditionally reserved for a small number of war correspondents. The older generation of war correspondents have adapted quickly, combining their traditional reporting approaches with the exploitation (and verification) of social media geolocation and other data to report on the war. The war in Ukraine has seen a Cambrian explosion in new age war correspondents. and western military organisations would do well to better understand, and potential leverage this new group of influencers during the conduct of military operations and military deception activities.
Data from civilian technologies can provide a signature that might be exploited by a variety of actors. Open-source satellite data is playing a role in Ukraine operations, and in measuring more strategic activities. These open-source sensors often utilise older versions of contemporary military technology. And as the NASA FIRMS demonstrates, these provide only rough approximations of events that might be related to military activity. But intelligence activities – and busting through deception measures – is about assembling multiple layers of information to build a complete picture or hypothesis of what those layers mean.
The ability of open-source sensors, often used by civilian intelligence agencies such as Bellingcat or citizen analysts like Brady Africk, to detect military activity means that military institutions must be even more careful and cleverer with their signatures in the 21st century.
This has resulted in an environment in which intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination is underpinned by a meshed military-civil sensor network. Both Ukraine and Russia leverage this network for their physical as well as influence targeting. And while much attention is focussed on the conflict in Ukraine, what about the Indo-Pacific region and in particular, preparations for any future conflict over Taiwan?
China Lessons about the Meshed Civil-Military Environment
In an early 2023 recent address to Georgetown University, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, William Burns noted that the Chinese President was drawing lessons from the poor performance of the Russian military and its weapons systems in Ukraine. I have written previously about the lessons that President Xi and the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) might take away from the conflict in Ukraine. I think there are three key lessons with regards to the transformational meshed civil-military sensor, analysis and dissemination environment that has expanded massively during the war in Ukraine.
First, in the lead up to – or during – any conflict over Taiwan, the Chinese Communist Party leadership and the PLA will not want a Taiwanese version of Ukrainian President Zelensky appearing in Taipei. Zelensky’s leadership and strategic communication skills have both unified his nation and resulted in a massive influx of foreign military and economic assistance. The Chinese Communist Party therefore will be contemplating how to prevent a Taiwanese President generating such influence. The Chinese will be examining ways to prevent the Taiwanese using the new media environment to solicit support. And, it must be said, the Chinese security agencies as well as the PLA will be studying closely the Russian failed attempts to decapitate the Ukrainian government at the start of the Ukraine War.
Second, the Chinese will be exploring the telecommunications infrastructure of Taiwan to shut it down as much as possible before any conflict. The Ukrainian telecommunications network, hardened in the wake of the 2014 Russian invasion and subsequent cyber-attacks, has enabled foreign and domestic journalists, milbloggers and citizen journalists to export the images and stories from the war that have assisted Ukrainian strategic influence activities. Shutting down the existing infrastructure in Taiwan would also be a high priority for the Chinese under their Systems Destruction Warfare doctrine to corrode the ability of the government to talk to the people, coordinate national defence, and destroy the ability of the Taiwanese military to sustain effective command and control.
Finally, the Chinese Communist Party will also be learning about the relatively permissive environment for Russian milbloggers in Russia. Russian milbloggers have been an important source of information on the war by domestic and foreign audiences and have often been critical of the Russian Ministry of Defence. President Putin has even met with these citizen analysts this year. Such a situation is unlikely to be supported by the Chinese Communist Party if there is any chance that such an indigenous community of commentators about a conflict over Taiwan could ‘go off script’. Even worse, they could even report on PLA failures. The Chinese Communist Party might offer a product that approximates this Russian milblogger community in the event of a war over Taiwan but is likely to be much less forgiving of those who do not adhere to party narratives.
A Conflict over Taiwan: The Open-Source Environment
There is an active and growing array of private, academic and citizen-led collection, analysis and dissemination of information about China, Taiwan, the United States and other nations in the Western Pacific.
Open-source satellite imagery has also been used to detect and monitor Chinese construction of islands and bases in the south China Sea - a signature difficult to hide - and monitor the construction or maintenance of ships for the PLA Navy and the Russian Navy. They might also be used to monitor training activities (to assess readiness and leadership capabilities) as well as equipment status and posture prior to deployments.
A list of some of the better resources for open source information on Chinese and Taiwanese military capabilities and issues is below. I am sure there are many more and will update this over time.
Taiwan Government
Ministry of National Defense. This is the official website of Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense. It covers current events. https://www.mnd.gov.tw/English/default.aspx
Taiwan Think Tanks
Center for Peace and Security. This Taipei-based think tank is focussed on Taiwan defence issues. It publishes an annual report on Taiwan defence issues. Its president, Admiral Lee His-Min, is the author of the 2017 Overall Defense Concept. You can read more here: https://tse.org.tw/?p=2561&lang=en
Institute for National Policy Research. This institute undertakes engagement with foreign think tanks and publishes reports on an array of defence, foreign affairs and national security topics. Its website can be found here: http://inpr.org.tw/?Lang=en
Institute for National Defense and Security Research. This Taiwanese institute undertakes analysis on a range of defence and national security issues, and also issues and annual reports on the development of the PLA, Indo-Pacific Security and defence technologies. It ou can follow the work of the Institute for National Defense and Security Research here: https://indsr.org.tw/en/index
Taiwan Foundation for Democracy. A non-profit organisation that is located in Taipei, it was founded by the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to promote democracy around the world. Its site can be found here: https://www.tfd.org.tw/en/index
Non-Taiwan Think Tanks, Institutions and Resources
Asia-Maritime Security Initiative. This site, run by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, is a good source, particularly for satellite imagery of Chinese-claimed islands and Chinese-constructed structures in the South China Sea. You can access it here: https://amti.csis.org
National Institute for Defense Studies. This Japanese think tank is the Japanese Ministry of Defense's core policy research organization. It undertakes research and studies with a policy orientation mainly on security and military history. NIDS is also a strategic college-level educational institution for the training of high-level officers from the Japanese Self-Defense Force. You can access NIDS material here: http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/about_us/index.html
One of the best publications from the xx is their annual China Security Report. You can find these annual reports, in English, Japanese and Chinese, here: http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/chinareport/index.html
China Aerospace Studies Institute. Part of the US Air Force Air University, this is a site focussed (naturally) on Chinese air and space capabilities and analysis, as well as information on the Strategic Support Force and PLA Rocket Force. It is an excellent resource, and you can even download a pdf of the 2020 version of the Science of Military Strategy. You can access this, and many other publications, here: https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/
China Maritime Studies Institute. Housed at the US Naval War College, this is another excellent open source organization that provides analysis and reports about PLA maritime capabilities and operations. You can find it online here: https://www.usnwc.edu/Research-and-Wargaming/Research-Centers/China-Maritime-Studies-Institute
Taiwan Defense & National Security. This US-based has a variety of resources, including announcements about US military assistance and sales to Taiwan, and Taiwan’s strategic defence documents. The site is here: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com
The Global Taiwan Institute. This Washington DC-based think tank conducts policy research and education programs about Taiwan. https://globaltaiwan.org/about-us/
RAND Reports. The RAND corporation has published a variety of reports about Taiwan. There have been four good reports just in the past two months on issues related to the defence of Taiwan. The reports can be found here: https://www.rand.org/topics/taiwan.html
War on the Rocks. War on the Rocks has published a multitude of articles about Taiwan defence issues. You can find these here: https://warontherocks.com/tag/taiwan/
Congressional Research Service. The CRS provide briefs on many, many topics. Here is the link to one of their most recent Taiwan briefs: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10275
The Annual Pentagon Assessment on Chinese Military Developments. This annual report is a must read for those interested in Chinese military developments and cross-strait security issues. The latest version, from November 2022, can be found here: https://www.defense.gov/CMPR/
Social Media Feeds
The Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense maintains a good Twitter feed, which is updated regularly. It includes daily updates on Chinese military and coast guard incursions into Taiwanese waters and airspace. You can follow them here: @MoNDefense
Damien Symon. One of my favourite feeds, this account tracks Chinese incursions into Taiwanese territory and maps them daily and monthly. A fine resource, found on Twitter - @detresfa_
Ryan Hass. Ryan has published an array of great reports and articles on Taiwan and China defense and security issues. You can follow Ryan at @ryanl_hass
Andrew Erickson. There are few who know the PLA Navy and Chinese maritime operations like Professor Andrew Erickson from the US Naval War College. You can follow him here: @AndrewSErickson.
Great thoughts on the information environment, Mick. The more transparent and empirical information/data all have the better is decision making on all sides which reduces the risk of miscalculation and/or decisions based on faulty assumptions. This is the value of the civil/military sensor network. The issue of decapitation of the government leadership for fear of a Taiwanese Zelenskyy should be far more difficult for the PLA given water and geographic distance. But the real question is will Taiwan stand up and not be cowed by fear, just as Zelenskyy and his government did? Part of Russia’s strategy assumed that fear. When it did not happen...we know the rest. Will China and the PLA have learned the lesson that it cannot be assumed and assured that Taiwan will collapse and not fight effectively? Russia made this terrible assumption and has paid the price.
Lastly, is China willing to pay the high cost of such an adventure? The more Xi cracks down, the more apparent it becomes there is discontent. The economic base while strong in manufacturing, is weak otherwise. It depends on being a part of the global economy, and invading Taiwan would hurt China as much as its trading partners.