Trump v Harris: Implications for Ukraine

Two articles that explore what Harris and Trump administrations might mean for the trajectory of the war in Ukraine.

Source: BBC

Recently, I had the opportunity to write two pieces for the Lowy Institute that examined the implications of a Trump or a Harris U.S. administration for the war in Ukraine.

As the institute makes clear in the introduction to both of these examinations, “the Institute has no house position on Donald Trump. The authors of these essays write in their own names. Their assessments vary depending on the region and issues they cover.”

My first contribution to this was a piece on the implications of a second Trump administration for Ukraine. As I write in the article:

The Russians have previously stated that any peace plan proposed by a Trump administration would have to reflect the reality on the ground in Ukraine, but that Putin remains open to talks. To this must now be added the reality on the ground in Kursk. However, should Trump not be able to achieve a quick solution in the Ukraine war, he could well turn on Putin and increase US support to Ukraine.

There is much that might happen to impact voter intentions between now and the November election. But one thing is certain. The Ukrainians understand what is at stake if they lose Russia’s war of aggression. Even if a Trump administration attempts to force them into an unsustainable armistice, Ukraine would likely choose to fight on without US support. That is still a better option than subjecting themselves to what is likely to be only a short-term reprieve from ongoing Russian predation.

You can read my full article, as well as pieces from a range of other contributors, here.

My second article looked at a Harris administration from January 2025. Clearly this will be an administration that is different in outlook to a potential Trump administration. I write in this article that:

During the recent US presidential debate, moderator David Muir asked the two candidates the following question: “I want to ask you a very simple question tonight. Do you want Ukraine to win this war?” Former president Trump failed to provide a yes or no answer. He was criticised for this by Vice President Harris during the debate and by commentators in the wake of the event.

But, while Harris provided a long-winded answer to the question, she too failed to say “yes” or “no”. This is illustrative not only of the respective candidates’ views but of the US policy for Ukraine. It is not really clear that the United States wants to Ukraine to win the war. While America obviously supports Ukraine, its primary strategic objective appears to be to avoid war with Russia. Avoiding World War III is a topic frequently raised by President Biden.

After 33 months of war there is still no public US strategy for the war beyond slogans like “as long as it takes” (although a classified strategy was reportedly delivered to Congress recently). And while Ukraine is now briefing US policy-makers on a victory plan , it is not clear that this is anything more than a grab bag of military and financial requests.

The only nation that appears to possess a clear strategy, and a viable theory of victory, is Russia. Thus, a future President Harris will need to deal with a central problem in America’s support for Ukraine: does it want Ukraine to beat Russia and is it willing to provide the military, diplomatic and financial resources to do so?

You can read the full text of my article, and the other contributions to this examination of a potential Harris administration in the U.S., here.

The key issue for the United States, regardless of who wins the election in November, is what their strategy for Ukraine will be. At present, the current U.S. strategy for Ukraine extends little beyond avoiding nuclear war. The support that America has provided is greatly appreciated, but when neither candidate can clearly state that they want Ukraine to win this war against the Russian aggressor, there is clearly a challenge moving forward with U.S. strategy, as well as how this might influence the support for Ukraine from other nations.

It is worth reinforcing a key line from my article on a potential Harris administration:

The only nation that appears to possess a clear strategy, and a viable theory of victory, is Russia.

We do not know what the Ukrainian ‘Victory Plan’ looks like, NATO is stuck in slogans like ‘for as long as it takes’ and the U.S. strategy for Ukraine was delivered in secret to the U.S. congress 33 months after the start of the war.

It is no wonder that Putin and Xi both think that they have our measure, and that they believe that the West is in decline. I recently examined this issue in an article about what the Chinese leadership might have learned from Western decision-making in the past three years. As I wrote in that piece:

It is only prudent for Western policy makers and strategists to assume that the Chinese government is studying the war in Ukraine at least as closely as they studied the Pacific War, the Falklands War, 1991 Gulf War, the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the war in Afghanistan. We must assume that CCP and the PLA will learn and adapt, even if there are gaps or shortfalls in our ability to accurately observe all of the Chinese adaptations based on Ukraine observations. China’s ability to study and assess the strengths and weaknesses of western decision-making modalities, and then implement changes within the structures of the CCP, will be a key part of this learning. There are many areas the Chinese might exploit. However, there is still time for Western nations to study and learn from how they made strategic decisions about Ukraine as well.

A change in the U.S. administration in January 2025 is a fine opportunity to rethink Western strategy for confronting Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, something that is now a single mega-problem rather than separate regional challenges. Whether a Harris or Trump administration can rise to that challenge remains to be seen.